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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective
of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to
function more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in
output and employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation near
the 3 per cent medium term target. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to estab-
lish the monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of
careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the
inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance transparency, the
Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report on Inflation pres-
ents the inflation forecasts prepared by the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate, as well as the macroeconomic
developments underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, while twice a year partial updates of the
forecasts are also prepared. The forecasts of the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate are based on certain
assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecasts, the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate assumes an unchanged
monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used
in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate’s staff under the general
direction of Ágnes CSERMELY, Deputy Director. The project was managed by Mihály András KOVÁCS, Deputy Head of
Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán GYENES, Zoltán M. JAKAB, Gábor KÁTAY and Barnabás VIRÁG. The Report was
approved for publication by István HAMECZ, Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include, Hedvig HORVÁTH, Éva KAPONYA, Gergely KISS, Péter KOROKNAI, Zsolt LOVAS,
Szabolcs LÕRINCZ, Balázs PÁRKÁNYI, E. Viktor SZABÓ, Máté Barnabás TÓTH. Other contributors to the analyses and fore-
casts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate. 
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings
on 6 November 2006 and 20 November 2006. However, the projections and policy considerations reflect the views of
the Economics Analysis and Research staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary Council or the MNB.
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Overview
Relative to the August update there is no significant change in our baseline
macroeconomic forecast.
1
The inflation and wage figures that we have
received in the meantime exceed our previous expectations and have
chenged the picture we have outlined on inflation trends in August. Hence,
in spite of tighter monetary conditions our baseline projection for inflation
remains significantly above the medium-term inflation target over the entire
forecast horizon. However, our forecast for core inflation projects a gradual
decline in inflation in the second half of the forecast horizon.
Since the August update, several macroeconomic data have been pub-
lished, which differ from the path we previously anticipated. 
Trend inflation increased more rapidly last quarter, and the month-on-month
core inflation index for September increased substantially, even after elimi-
nating the impact of quasi one-off items. This massive increase in prices is
not limited to any one component, as it is evident in all of the main core infla-
tion items. 
Another negative surprise arose in connection with the inflation outlook,
namely that gross average earnings in the private sector bounced back
after the drop during the middle of the year and increased significantly in
July and August. Although, the payments of bonuses – which cannot be
regarded as a permanent component – played a significant role in the
extraordinary growth in average earnings, wage dynamics corrected for
these remain higher than we expected. All these point towards increasing
wage inflation pressure in the private sector.
In the second quarter of 2006, there was an unprecedented fall in the vol-
ume of gross fixed capital formation, despite economic growth at a rate
close to its potential, associated with a steady rise in the rate of capacity util-
isation. Another reason that would have pointed towards higher investment
volume is that the investment intensity of the business sector has previous-
ly been known to move in tandem with international economic activity.
Current external market conditions can be regarded as favourable: growth
in net exports has been a dominating factor on the expenditure side of GDP,
induced by favourable trends in external economic activity, and household
consumption has increased at a moderate rate. 
Looking forward, we stand by our position that the path of the economy will
be dominated by the fiscal adjustment measures; however, uncertainty sur-
rounding the expected path is growing in the wake of information received
during the last quarter. In line with the picture we outlined in the August
update, we foresee lower aggregate demand for the next two years, which
will have a disinflationary effect, while other aspects of the fiscal adjustment
measures (increases in taxes and contributions, in indirect taxes and regu-
lated prices) and the weakening in the forint exchange rate since the begin-
ning of the year will appear as a cost shock and will spur higher inflation.
There was only a slight change in the 
baseline scenario in spite of tighter 
monetary conditions
The latest data indicate a sharp increase in
trend inflation and wage inflation pressure
Slower growth and higher inflation
induced by fiscal adjustment measures
1
Based on actual data and other information received by 8 November 2006.
In the baseline scenario we continue to presume that economic actors, look-
ing forward to a substantial drop in economic growth and anticipating its
impact, will adjust to the cost shock without incurring second round inflation-
ary effects, meaning that inflation expectations will remain co-ordinated.
Slower demand, however, can only partially offset the primary impacts.
Although, based on the information available, the factors behind the recent
surge in inflation cannot be determined unambiguously, in the baseline sce-
nario we assume that past cost shocks will unwind slowly. Hence, we look
upon these as one-off factors, which consequently will increase our inflation
forecast only in the short run. In some product markets, however, we expect
to see additional inflationary impacts, mainly due to the reduction in the dis-
inflationary effect of more intense competition since Hungary's accession to
the EU.
In our forecast we have not made any substantial changes in our view concern-
ing the labour market. The part of the fiscal measures that increase employers'
costs is responsible for inflation pressure coming from the direction of unit
labour costs, but on account of loose labour market conditions we expect that
employees will be unable to pass the real wage lowering impact of changes in
tax and contribution liabilities on to employers. At the same time, in light of the
latest labour market data we anticipate that wage developments may be stick-
ier and more backward looking. Accordingly, we expect to see gross wages
grow in the private sector at a rate somewhat higher than that we anticipated
in August, which in turn will increase inflation pressure on the cost side. 
The impact of factors pointing toward higher inflation is mitigated by the fact that
real interest rates have been increasing in recent months and the exchange rate
appreciated by close to 4 per cent by October. Market expectations indicate
further strengthening in the exchange rate over the long run; this prospect, how-
ever, has not been taken into account in our baseline forecast. 
Our forecast relies on the assumption of a constant policy interest rate, an
oil price path based on forward contracts and a HUF/EUR exchange rate
fixed at the October average level. In our main scenario, we assume that the
fiscal measures are completely implemented as announced. In our opinion,
however, the implementation risks surrounding these measures have not
diminished significantly, on account of which the sustainability risks sur-
rounding the baseline scenario did not disappear completely.
During the next two years, due to lower aggregate demand, economic
growth will fall substantially below its potential, and it will be around 2.5 per
cent in both 2007 and 2008. The output gap reflects the fiscal measures
and, to a lesser extent, the downturn in external economic activity. 
Forward looking indicators of economic activity lead us to expect that the
growth rate in Europe will slow down in 2007. A drop in domestic absorption
will result in significantly lower growth in import volumes, while the dynam-
ics of export growth is expected to slow gradually in 2007 and 2008.
The dynamics of gross fixed capital formation will slow considerably in
2007, primarily due to the reduction in household and government expendi-
tures. At the same time, the growth rate of investment by companies is
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Tighter monetary conditions tend to
reduce inflation pressure
For the most part the surprise in the 
inflation and wage paths are considered
one-off, yet it will slow disinflation
Lower consumption, slowing investment
and foreign trade dynamics, improving
external balance
Forecast conditions
expected to drop to a lesser extent. Starting from 2008, new EU funds will
be available in the government sector and are expected to generate growth
in the volume of investments, which in turn will bring about a moderate
expansion in investment dynamics at the whole-economy level.
Household consumption is expected to fall in 2007, in the wake of the fiscal
measures, while in 2008 it will remain at the level of 2007. In our forecast we
have relied on the presumption that households will smooth their consump-
tion; therefore, over the short term consumption will decline less than dis-
posable income.
In response to lower domestic absorption, the external financing requirement
may drop to around 4 per cent of GDP in 2007, and below 3 per cent in 2008.
Although the inflationary impact of the government's measures is already
reflected in the current figures to some extent, in the first half of 2007 we
expect the rate of inflation to continue rising sharply, which may be followed
by gradual disinflation from the second half of 2007. According to the base-
line scenario of our conditional forecast, in 2007 the average annual rate of
inflation will reach 7 per cent, and will approximate 4 per cent in 2008. At the
same time, in 2008 there is a substantial difference between the dynamics of
headline and core inflation. Mostly due to our assumption concerning regulat-
ed price developments, the headline price index will hover around 4 per cent
throughout the whole year, while the core price index, which better reflects
underlying inflation developments, shows further disinflation.
According to the November average of the market's interest rate and
exchange rate expectations, the forint might strengthen against the euro to
HUF 259 and the central bank base rate decrease close to 7 per cent by the
end of 2007; and both could stabilise in 2008. If we use these assumptions
in our projection, our annual inflation forecast for 2007 would be lower by 0.3
percentage points, and our forecast for 2008 would be 0.4 percentage
points lower. Concerning our forecast of the rate of GDP growth, the change
would be 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points lower than the baseline for the next
two years.
The most important assumption contained in the baseline forecast is that medi-
um-term inflation expectations are well anchored. Stronger growth of trend infla-
tion and the observed wage path, however, may also indicate that the co-ordi-
nation of inflation expectations have weakened substantially. As our models are
not able to reflect any potential problems in the co-ordination of expectations,
and because whether or not the problem exists cannot be clearly determined
beyond reasonable doubt from the actual data, the impact of any co-ordination
related problems is displayed in the distribution of risks surrounding the main
scenario. On account of the co-ordination problem, the cost shocks which were
previously assumed to be temporary may spill over, the nominal wage path may
significantly exceed the baseline, and from the beginning of 2007 higher infla-
tion expectations may be incorporated into wage agreements. The implemen-
tation risk of fiscal measures, which are expected to contain consumption and
wage dynamics, also indicate uncertainty pointing to higher inflation.
At the same time, uncertainty surrounding the demand reducing impact of fis-
cal adjustments – if implemented in full – may represent a downside risk fac-
OVERVIEW
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During the first half of 2007 inflation will
top out above 8 per cent, then turn back
down
Increasing uncertainty around the baseline
scenario, with close to symmetrical risks
tor. Households may be able to smooth their consumption expenditures only to
a degree below what is contained in the baseline scenario; therefore, the drop
in aggregate demand could be sharper, on account of which the probability of
an inflation path below that indicated in the baseline forecast may grow high-
er. Furthermore, the inflation path may also be lower if the impact of the output
gap on inflation exceeds our expectation, or if gas prices are increased at a
pace below what we have forecasted. On the whole, the risks surrounding the
baseline scenario of the inflation forecast can be deemed symmetrical.
As for the rate of economic growth, the risks also appear symmetrical result-
ing from two main offsetting uncertainty factors. A more intense drop in con-
sumption may have a downward effect on the rate of economic growth,
while the risks of implementation of the fiscal measures are likely to have an
upward effect relative to the baseline scenario.
Conditional inflation forecast fan chart
Conditional GDP growth forecast fan chart
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Summary table of the baseline scenario
(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario reflecting the most probable scenario 
that applies only if all the assumptions presented materialise; unless otherwise specified, 
percentage changes on a year earlier)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation
1
5.9 2.1 2.4 6.1 4.0
Consumer price index 6.7 3.6 3.9 6.9 4.1
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 2.4 2.0 2.9 2.2 2.3
Impact of fiscal demand
2
-0.5 0.8 1.5 -4.2 -2.0
Household consumption
3
3.6 2.1 2.4 -0.9 0.0
Gross fixed capital formation
3
8.5 6.7 4.2 2.1 4.3
Domestic absorption
3
4.1 0.8 0.9** 0.0** 1.4
Export
3
15.8 10.7 15.7 9.8 9.1
Import
3,4
13.6 6.5 12.1** 7.4** 8.4
GDP
3
5.2 (4.9)** 4.1 (4.3)** 3.9 2.5 2.4
Current account deficit
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.5 6.8 7.1** 5.5** 4.3
EUR billions 6.9 6.0 6.2** 5.2** 4.3
External financing requirement
4
As a percentage of GDP 8.2 6.0 6.0** 4.1** 2.6
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings
5
5.9 8.9 7.2 5.3 4.7
Whole-economy employment
6
-0.4 0.0 0.8 -0.2 0.3
Private sector gross average earnings 9.3 6.9 8.3 7.3 7.0
Private sector employment
6
-0.2 0.3 1.6 0.3 0.5
Private sector unit labour cost 1.8 2.2 5.3 5.6 4.7
Household real income 3.9 3.6*** 2.5 -3.8 1.7
1
For technical reasons, the indicator we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it follows a simi-
lar trend. 
2
Calculated using the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
Actual and forecasted
GDP data do not contain the changes in the CSO’s method of GDP calculation, which were published on the 2nd of October. 
4
As a result of uncertainty in the
measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 actual current account deficit and external financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official
figures or our projections based on such figures. 
5
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
6
According to the CSO labour force survey.
* In 2004, the leap-year effect caused an upward distortion in GDP growth of some 0.2 percentage points, and a downward shift in the same amount in 2005.
In order for trends in growth to be assessed, these effects must be applied to adjust the original data; corrected values are shown in brackets.
** Our projection includes the impact of the Hungarian Army’s Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases community consump-
tion and imports.
*** An MNB estimate.

1. Financial markets

Risk appetite on the global financial markets fluctuated sig-
nificantly in the past half year, in contrast to the previous,
relatively stable environment. In May and June, the
increasing uncertainty triggered an emerging market sell-
off, and investors temporarily decreased their exposure to
risk to a great degree. Although risk appetite later
approached the high levels seen in the spring as a result
of the ensuing recovery, looking forward investor sentiment
may continue to be more fragile. 
The deterioration of risk appetite is mainly attributable to
the end of the accommodating monetary policy and low
yield levels which were characteristic of the main markets
in the past few years. The change in monetary policy –
tightening by the Fed first, followed this year by the ECB
and other central banks – gradually raised the level of risk-
free interest rates, but investors only slowly adjusted to the
changing yield environment. This behaviour was support-
ed by the fact that the US tightening cycle took place in line
with expectations, without any major surprises. However, in
the middle of this year, as the end of the tightening cycle
approached, uncertainty related to the future dollar interest
rate path increased. Due to the steady increase in raw
material prices over the last few years and the higher-than-
expected inflation figures, the inflation risk perceived by
the markets increased in May and June, and the expected
dollar interest rate path rose. As inflation fears diminished,
some market participants were seized by recession fears
in August and September, which were mainly related to the
anticipated slowdown in the US real estate market. The fre-
quent changes and wide range of expectations further
exacerbated market uncertainty.
The first signs of a decline in risk exposure at the global
level emerged during the spring of this year, followed by
the first wave of major international selling in May and
June. The rapid decline in risk exposure affected many
countries and many types of assets, and in countries trou-
bled by external imbalance problems or internal political
turmoil this led to substantial weakening of the exchange
rates. Whereas investors had previously disregarded fun-
damentals for the most part, during the sell-off fundamen-
tals were once again given a greater role. 
The sell-off however only temporarily reversed the influx of
capital into the emerging markets. As inflation fears dwin-
dled, the expected dollar interest rate path and long-term
yields also diminished, and the interest rate hikes imple-
mented by the central banks of the countries affected also
helped to improve the mood in the emerging markets.
According to market expectations, the projected slowdown
of the American economy will be moderate and gradual,
which could lead to a decrease in the dollar interest rate,
however expectations continue to range widely.
FINANCIAL MARKETS
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 2006 15
Chart 1-1
Central bank base rates
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Chart 1-2
Fed primary rate and estimated levels of the primary rate*
at various times
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Chart 1-3
Trends in emerging market currencies this year 
(cumulative, 2 January 2006 = 0)
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On the whole, the international investment climate has
remained favourable. Moreover, the reduction in raw mate-
rials prices in August and September had a beneficial
effect on the markets with respect to inflation and growth
concerns, and this was also reflected in a strong stock
market rally. Historically, risk indices remain at very low lev-
els; however, investors still tend to differentiate between
countries on the basis of macroeconomic or political risks.
As investors’ desire to take risks have diminished, the vul-
nerability of forint assets have further increased. While dur-
ing periods of emerging market rallies investors broadly
ignored Hungarian country-specific risks (namely the budg-
et deficit and the current account deficit, both of which are
extremely high by international standards), the forint suf-
fered a significant setback during the sell-off and its volatili-
ty increased. The prices of forint assets clearly moved in
conjunction with riskier assets, and were thus particularly
sensitive to changes in investor sentiment. Deteriorating
sentiment on Hungarian fundamentals was clearly reflected
in the major credit rating agencies’ downgrades of
Hungarian public debt ratings or outlook since the end of
2005. Investors did not find the official target date for the
introduction of the euro to be credible, which contributed to
this deterioration of sentiment. The announcement of the sig-
nificantly higher-than-planned budget deficit and public
debt figures had further unfavourable market effects.
Although political risks in the wake of the elections had a
negative impact throughout the entire CE4 region (deadlock
in the Czech parliament, resignation of the Polish prime min-
ister, new government coalition in Slovakia), the perform-
ance of forint assets still clearly lagged behind that of the
neighbouring countries. During this time the forint became
the most volatile currency in the region.
The forint reached a historical low versus the euro and tem-
porarily traded on the weak side of the intervention band.
The EUR/HUF 270-280 trading band that eventually
evolved was 9 to 10 per cent below the EUR/HUF 245-255
exchange rate level that dominated most of last year’s trad-
ing. At the same time, Reuters’ surveys indicated that ana-
lysts predicted the exchange rate to stabilise at EUR/HUF
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 200616
Chart 1-4
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Chart 1-5
Developments in CEBI indices* calculated in euro 
(1 September 2005 = 100)
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Date Agency Statement
6 Dec. 2005 Fitch downgrade (BBB+)
26 Jan. 2006 S&P negative outlook (A-)
22 Feb. 2006 Moody’s negative outlook (A1)
15 June 2006 S&P downgrade (BBB+), negative outlook 
20 Sept. 2006 Fitch negative outlook (BBB+)
22 Sept. 2006 Moody’s beginning of review for a downgrade (A1)
4 Oct. 2006 JCR downgrade (A-)
Table 1-1
Statements by credit rating agencies on Hungarian public debt
* Total yield of portfolios comprised of standard government papers meas-
ured in euro.
270 between June and the end of 2006 and at EUR/HUF
262 by the end of 2007 despite significant movements in
the spot rate. 
As a result of the substantial weakening of the exchange
rate, the expected inflationary effect of the recently
announced fiscal adjustment measures, and the premium
shock sustained by the emerging markets, market partici-
pants priced in substantial interest rate hikes in June.
Since June, the MNB has increased the reference interest
rate by a total of 200 base points. Although the consensus
among analysts and the interest rate path priced in by the
market suggested a somewhat less stringent monetary
policy, the subsequent, moderate market reactions follow-
ing the actions taken by the central bank showed that the
changes in the base rate did not surprise the market, and
that its communication properly guided market expecta-
tions. Despite the interest rate hikes, yields on long-term
government bonds declined compared to levels at the end
of June; hence, the moves helped to stabilize the financial
market situation. The one-year ex-ante real interest rate
dropped to below 2 per cent in the middle of the year and
stayed below the past years’ average even after the rise in
interest rates. The strengthening of the forint in the autumn
contributed to the tightening of monetary conditions, which
had relaxed significantly in the second half of last year and
the first half of this year. The markets anticipate that there
will be room for a decrease in the base rate next year.
In October, the exchange rate recovered from its previ-
ous depreciation, borne by the improving environment for
international investments, higher central bank interest
rates and the market’s perception of a decline in risks
related to the implementation of measures to reduce the
budget deficit.
The credibility and implementation of the adjustment
programme is likely to have a major impact on forint
FINANCIAL MARKETS
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 2006 17
Chart 1-6
EUR/HUF exchange rate
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Monetary conditions*
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The central bank base rate and the base estimated* for the
end of 2006 and 2007 from the yield curve
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market sentiment in the coming months as well. Despite
the improvement in the investment climate, Hungary is
still perceived as one of the riskier countries, and
accordingly forint assets may still be vulnerable to
shocks in risk appetite. Any increase in the risks associ-
ated with implementation of the adjustment programme
may result in an increase in the expected premium (as
seen during the period before the parliament vote of
confidence in September, for example) and may result
in further downgrading of Hungarian public debt. As
indicated by the level of long-term forward premiums,
investors remain sceptical about the convergence
process in Hungary. On the other hand, however, this
means that there may be more room for the reduction of
risk premia in the event of a credible improvement in the
budget balance. 
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2. Inflation and its 
determining factors

The first half of 2006 was characterised by strong econom-
ic activity (4.2 per cent GDP growth, 4.3 per cent season-
ally adjusted), due largely to better-than-expected external
demand, while domestic demand is considered weak.
2
A
decline in economic growth is forecasted relying upon the
indices of business confidence reflecting the future expec-
tations of our business partners, and also due to the fiscal
austerity measures introduced in Hungary.
Robust external economic activity – favourable
structure, deteriorating expectations
The indicators of external economic activity continue to
suggest strong demand on foreign markets. While the
demand of our largest commercial partners for exports
has not grown further, the growth rate is considered to be
close to an all-time high. The robust indices of external
business confidence also support this phenomena. The
sub-index of the IFO business index on economic activity
in Germany, reflecting six-month forward expectations,
forecasts unfavourable trends in the business climate,
which may be due in part to the demand-decreasing
effects of the increase of VAT in Germany scheduled for
next January. At the international level, next year’s slow-
down forecast for the US economy may also be an impor-
tant factor as far as general expectations are concerned.
This slow-down, however, is now expected more likely to
be a “soft landing”. In summary, the current status of
external economic activity may be deemed to be at, or
near, its turning point.
It is important to note that the economic growth of
Hungary’s largest trade partner has taken place in an envi-
ronment that is considered favourable from the standpoint
of Hungarian exports. New industrial orders from Germany
show signs of strengthening in the product groups (capital
goods and intermediate products) which have historically
dominated Hungarian export sales to Germany. By con-
trast, new orders for consumer goods, which constitute a
smaller part of Hungarian exports, are decidedly less
dynamic. This viewpoint is supported by the factors con-
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2.1. Economic activity
2
The Q3 GDP figure was published by the CSO after the editorial deadline for the data for this Report. The new data points to a slowdown in economic
activity, which is in line with our expectations.
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Forecasts of Hungary’s export markets* and the GDP of
Hungary’s key foreign trade partners
(annual growth rates)
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tributing to the growth of GDP components in the euro area
which clearly illustrate that current economic activity is
largely driven by investments in fields to which Hungarian
exports are directed.
Industrial activity – dynamic growth
Due in part to the favourable external economic activity,
industrial production continued to show signs of dynamic
growth during the first half of 2006. Manufacturing
remained the leading factor in this expansion, and the
machine industry managed to retain its previous weight, as
it is supported by sales figures. Similarly to previous peri-
ods, export sales, which constitute a significant part of
manufacturing sales, grew dynamically. The expansion in
domestic sales, although it is somewhat less dynamic than
previously, is still considered higher than the historical
average, and this may be due to the fact that domestic
industrial sales are not only linked to the slowing internal
demand, but to the more robust external economic activity
as well.
The dynamics of value added in the first six months were
in harmony with gross production processes. In the first
quarter, value added in the manufacturing industry rose by
10.8 per cent, an all time high, while the growth rate slowed
down to 7.9 per cent in the second quarter. The growth
rate of value added in market services dropped to about
4.5 per cent.
During the first half of 2006 there was some improvement in
the foreign trade balance as a result of two contrasting
impacts. On the one hand, the volume of exports continued to
grow at a rate (15 per cent) higher than the volume of imports
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 200622
Chart 2-4
New industrial orders in Germany
(annual growth rates)
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Production and sales in the manufacturing industry
(annual growth rates)
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Industrial production – growth contributions by different
sectors*
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GDP growth and contributions by components in the euro
zone
(annual growth rates)
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(11 per cent), and this factor turned out to be the slightly
stronger of the two. This development was due to brisk exter-
nal demand and to the effects of the real depreciation that first
surfaced at the beginning of 2005. All these phenomena are
in line with the strong international economic activity men-
tioned earlier. On the other hand, the terms of trade deteriorat-
ed further, due almost entirely to an unfavourable shift in ener-
gy prices, similar to the developments that took place in 2005.
Investments – could there be a correction over the
short run?
In 2006 Q2, the volume of investments dropped 3.6 per
cent compared to the same period of the previous year.
Such a marked decline has not been registered since
1996. This pronounced drop was due largely to the mas-
sive reduction (6.8 per cent) in new construction, which
occurred as a result of the decline in non-commercial real
estate transactions, and also due to the status of state-
financed highway construction projects.
Purchases of machinery, equipment and vehicles are still
on the rise, although at a slower pace, which raises the
question as to the degree of harmony with strong industri-
al performance. The rate of capacity utilisation in the cor-
porate sector remained at an all-time high, mirroring a
steady rate of investment for the present with potential for
growth in the future. It is possible, though, that companies
are likely to view this new found prosperity as only tempo-
rary, or they may tend to view the cycle as already having
peaked. This presumption is underlined by the fall in busi-
ness confidence indices, indicating future expectations in
the external markets, and also by the impact of the govern-
ment’s proposed austerity measures.
Decreases in household consumption and in home
purchases 
A decline in both household consumption expenditure and
retail sales was registered in the second quarter. This means
that consumption during the past year and a half has grown
more slowly than income. Hence, the rate of growth in con-
sumption retreated to the level of 2001. This particular phe-
nomena may be attributed to reductions in income forecasts
and to increasing uncertainty regarding income prospects.
During the first six months the gap between the rate of
growth in the volume of retail sales and in household con-
sumption expenditure has narrowed – as we expected.
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Rate of capacity utilisation* in the manufacturing industry
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The reason for this was that while there was a drop in sales
of industrial products, mainly in the retail sector, the
increase in services – which are represented only in the
consumption expenditure figures – remained steady.
The retail sales figures for July and August suggest a mild
acceleration of the increase compared with the slowdown
of earlier months. This might be in close connection with
the higher-than-expected wage figures for the period. As
the latter might be considered as partly temporary, we
expect a gradual slowdown in retail sales figures for next
months, simultaneously with a slowdown in wage inflation
and a pick-up in inflation. 
In the second quarter, home purchases continued to
decline, albeit at a slower pace. Real prices in the real
estate market dropped even further, although to a lesser
degree in comparison to the previous quarters. There is
steady oversupply in the real estate market, which is still
the reason for the decline in home purchases. Insufficient
demand is due, in part, to the massive real estate pur-
chases of recent years, and also to the reductions in
income forecasts and to increasing uncertainty regarding
income prospects.
Economic growth – favourable dynamics, deterio-
rating prospects
Economic growth remained strong in the first quarter. As
revealed by seasonally adjusted data, GDP increased by
4.4 per cent in the first quarter and by 4.2 per cent in the
second quarter by comparison to the same periods of the
previous year. The short-base index, however, indicates a
minor deceleration in the first quarter and acceleration in
the second quarter, and hence the growth rate is fluctuat-
ing around its potential rate.
From the perspective of the expenditure side, the
largest – and increasing – contribution to growth was
made by net exports
3
, while the consumption compo-
nent remains below the historical average, despite
being higher than last year. The contribution of invest-
ments to growth dropped considerably in the first two
quarters of 2006.
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Household consumption expenditure and retail sales 
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3
As previously indicated, accounting problems may have surfaced in statistics as a side-effect of Hungary’s accession to the EU, and this could put the
growth of net export sales in a light more favourable than it actually is. However, we should point out that this effect will be lower this year than it was in
the previous two years.
From the production side, the growth rate of manufacturing
production in the second quarter continued to surpass that
of GDP. Growth in market services was close to the GDP
dynamics. The value added figures for the agriculture and
construction sectors, however, showed a decline in the
second quarter.
Economic activity of the Central-Eastern-European region
is characterised by accelerating GDP growth in Poland,
where as GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovakia came
to a standstill at high levels. In this light, growth in Hungary
appears to be the most stable, as well as the lowest after
the fourth quarter of 2005.
4
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4
With regard to the previous footnote, it should be mentioned that the aforementioned accounting problems arising in relation to Hungary’s accession to
the EU may emerge in different ways, to a different extent in the statistics published by the countries of the region. As we do not have any further infor-
mation regarding this matter, caution should be exercised in comparing GDP figures.
In the second and third quarters of 2006 the number and
the ratio of active workers continued to increase, but to a
lesser degree than previously. As a result of this and the
stagnating level of employment, which experienced a slow
start early this year, unemployment has increased.
Recently, the unemployment rate has taken wild turns and
currently stands at 7.5 per cent, coinciding with an activity
ratio of 55 per cent.
Wage pressure stemming from the increase in the mini-
mum wage at the beginning of the year and from massive
payments of bonuses was followed by a larger-than-
expected negative adjustment, and even though there was
some decline in the summer months, wage inflation
appears to be back on a rising trend as indicated by July
and August figures. Non-regular or premium payments
had again a decisive role in it, as partly due to government
tax hikes expected for September, payments were brought
forward in several industries of the private sector.
Increasing tendency was also evident in the regular pay-
ments. In the private sector, the annualised growth rate of
gross average wages in the month of August was 11.6 per
cent, while that of regular payments of wages indicates 8.2
per cent.
Activity grows at a rate faster than supported by
demographic data
Since 2001, the number of active workers on the labour
market increased by a rate in excess of what is supported
by demographic forecasts. What this indicates is that the
economy has substantial reserves in terms of labour force,
or from a different perspective, that it is not impossible to
curtail the rate of inactivity that is considered exceptional-
ly high by international standards. As to where this surplus
in growth originates from is difficult if not impossible to
explain relying on anecdotal information (such as the abol-
ishment of mandatory military service). One feasible expla-
nation may lie in the rapid increase of wages during the
early part of the decade, which had a beneficial effect in
encouraging previously inactive people to enter the labour
market, just as – closely related to the prior – changes in
the willingness of women to enter the labour market in light
of the fact that the growth in activity is dominated by the
activity of women, more specifically by women between 55
to 59 years of age. Fixing the rate of activity of this latter
age group at its lowest level in 1997, the entire growth in
the rate of activity of the total working population disap-
pears.
Increasing the statutory retirement age may offer a palpa-
ble explanation for this phenomena, that in all likelihood
had the most powerful effect on this particular age group.
However, this factor was taken into account by Hablicsek
(2005)
5
as a demographic process, whereas, in terms of
the effective retirement age, meaning the average age
when people in fact retire, there is no proof that the actual
retirement age has increased in tandem with the statutory
increase (Chart 2-16). 
In conclusion of the above, apart from the demographic
indices of society, the increase in the retirement age also
fails to provide any feasible explanation for growth in
labour force activity; still, the preferences of women in con-
nection with employment may offer a plausible cause that
has yet to be verified. Nevertheless, it appears undeniable
that increasing activity leads to a looser labour market from
the perspective of supply.
Moderate labour demand
In spite of the fact that wage costs in the last two years
have increased in line with productivity throughout the
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5
Hablicsek L.: Projection of demographic scenarios and economic activity for long-term retirement models, Aktív Társadalom Alapítvány (Active Society
Foundation), June 2005.
Chart 2-16
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entire private sector (Chart 2-19), the labour demand for
market services and in the manufacturing industry differs
significantly. While the rate of employment in the prior is
still on the rise, the latter shows a tendency that is just the
opposite. Structural changes, which are especially typical
for transition countries, may well be the reason for this
occurrence, and the fact that the cost of labour is increas-
ing faster than the cost of capital provides an additional
reason why labour continues to be substituted by capital
throughout the manufacturing industry, as we have previ-
ously indicated. This resulted in a structural shift from
labour intensive sectors to sectors which are more capital
intensive, and in consequence the labour demand in the
manufacturing industry has dropped, and the labour
demand in the private sector is at a standstill. The decom-
position of this process at the corporate level may offer
additional information of interest (Chart 2-17).
According to these figures, in 2002 there was only a tem-
porary setback in the value added of labour to growth, and
it rebounded in 2003 and 2004 in spite of the overall reduc-
tion of employment in the manufacturing industry. What
actually happened was that the capital intensive compa-
nies (e.g. in the machine industry, information technology
and communication sectors), which carry a larger weight in
growth, increased their workforce, while other sectors with
less and decreasing value added, which employ the
majority of the workforce in the manufacturing industry
(such as the textile industry) had to lay off many workers.
7
On the other hand, Chart 2-18 also indicates a kind of
structural shift, according to which during the last five
years in the manufacturing industry there has been an
increase in the average hours worked, which in addition
shows cyclical behaviour, while the size of workforce was
drastically reduced. This may be due to two fundamental
reasons. One is the structural labour shortage, which might
mean that it is impossible to hire people with the proper
skills. The other being the cyclical shortage of labour. This
might be compensated by increasing the capacity utilisa-
tion of the existing workforce, instead of hiring new employ-
ees because of the high adjustment costs involved.
Though extra work payments might also be costly it is still
possible that it is cheaper than cyclical employment.
Both capital-labour substitution and the intensifying capac-
ity utilisation of labour indicate moderate demand, in other
words a looser labour market from the perspective of
demand.
Consequence: increasing unemployment
As far as demand and supply is concerned, the labour
market appears to be on a looser path; notably, as indicat-
ed by current activity, supply in the labour market is
increasing, while according to the number of people cur-
rently employed, demand is stagnating. This tendency will
without a doubt result in increasing unemployment, and it
raises a question as to whether those constituting the
recent growth in activity (e.g. women in the 55-59 age
group) appear in the labour market with or without a job,
that is to say, as employed or unemployed.
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6
Data from 2001 should be analysed with caution, due to changes in accounting regulations although the authors have attempted to adjust for these
changes (source: G. Kátay–Z. Wolf: Driving Factors of Growth in Hungary – Decomposition Exercise, manuscript, 2006).
7
G. Kátay–Z. Wolf: Driving Factors of Growth in Hungary – Decomposition Exercise, manuscript, 2006.
Chart 2-17
Value added of labour to GDP growth and changes in the
size of workforce in the manufacturing industry, 
1994-2004
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Chart 2-18
Average hours worked and employment in 
the manufacturing industry, 1999-2006
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Looking at the age groups of the unemployed, the former
looks more feasible. In contrast with activity, young per-
sons are the driving factor behind increasing unemploy-
ment. The majority of jobless people are between 20 to 24
years of age, while the highest unemployment rate, far sur-
passing any other age group, emerges among the 15 to 19
age group (40.6 per cent), who are exactly the young low
skilled individuals.
8
Creeping wage inflation in spite of a
looser labour market
Before 2004, wages were increased at a rate higher than
the rate of productivity. In 2004 this trend reversed, prima-
rily after shocks from regulatory measures. Moreover, this
trend was supported by rising economic prosperity on the
international stage, as well as by the diminishing wage
pressure stemming from the capital-labour substitution as
mentioned above. However, data from 2005 show signs of
a slowdown in the latter, wages remained to increase con-
sistently with productivity (Chart 2-19).
Over the last several years, wage inflation in the manufac-
turing and service industry more or less evened out.
Nevertheless, the first half of 2006 indicates that the
processes occurring in these two sectors are quite differ-
ent. In our view, this may be due to the following basic rea-
sons: One is that, based on the statistics, the increase in
the minimum wage is more evident in market services, in
all likelihood because there are more employees regis-
tered at the minimum wage in this sector. On the other
hand, the bonus payments, which we will discuss in detail
in the next section, had a more significant impact in this
sector. Furthermore, the conditions for workforce demand
are different in these two sectors: In the manufacturing
industry, productivity has increased more rapidly, resulting
in a relatively looser labour market, albeit to the best of our
knowledge most of this growth in productivity is cyclical in
nature. By contrast, in the market services sector labour
demand is on the rise while productivity remains low.
The volume of non-regular (bonus) payments (Chart 2-21),
which constitutes a significant factor in both sectors, though
to different degrees, is of particular importance from the
standpoint of the period under review. The minimum wage
increase prescribed for the beginning of this year – in accor-
dance with our predictions and due to the faster-than-
expected negative adjustment – did not have a prolonged
effect in the private sector, however, wage inflation pressure
did make its presence felt. In addition, the surprising inten-
sity of bonus payments exceeded all expectations, based
upon previous years figures, and made a massive contribu-
tion to this in the manufacturing industry, and even more so
in the services sectors. The reason for this may be sought in
the rearrangement of profit and productivity surplus from last
year, and, with respect to July and August, in making pay-
ments prematurely in order to avoid the payment of higher
employers’ and employee’s contributions as announced. In
the chart, the increase in regular gross average earnings
can also be detected.
A looser labour market carries the potential to ease wage
inflation in its own right. However, the latest – unexpected-
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Chart 2-19
Unit labour cost, real labour costs and productivity in the
private sector, 1999-2006 
(annualised growth rate and level)
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Chart 2-20
Increase of gross average wages in the manufacturing
industry, in the market services sector and in the whole
private sector
(annualised quarterly growth rate, per cent)
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8
This group is followed by the 20 to 24 age group; however, their unemployment rate is less than half of the youngest (18.1 per cent).
ly high – inflation figures may have the opposite effect. On
this basis, we will outline two different scenarios, both of
which may be consistent with existing payroll data, and we
cannot be certain as to which one of the two will eventual-
ly materialise. In the first scenario, payments of bonuses
will be substantially reduced during the remainder of the
year, and market participants will handle the outstanding
inflation figures as a simple shock, and will ignore them in
terms of their future expectations. As a consequence, the
temporarily surge in wage inflation (with and without
bonuses) will slow down, and the economy will experience
diminished wage inflation induced by the looser labour
market. However, according to the other scenario, market
agents increase their inflation expectations, yet they are
only able to adjust to this higher nominal wage path due to
the wage contracts fixed at the beginning of the year
through non-regular payments. In this case, massive
bonus payments are projected for the remainder of the
year, and wage inflation reflecting these bonuses will pre-
vail, since from the beginning of 2007 higher inflation
expectations may be incorporated into contracts for regu-
lar wages. 
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Chart 2-21
Gross average earnings in the private sector with 
and without bonuses
(monthly data annual growth rates, per cent)
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Changes in consumer prices are greater than projected in
the August update, showing a rising tendency. In the third
quarter of 2006, the annual index of consumer prices stood
at 4.1 per cent, while the rate of core inflation was 2.8 per
cent, representing a 1.5 and 1.8 per cent increase, respec-
tively, compared with the previous quarter.
9
The reason behind this substantial increase may be attributed
to several factors, such as the net 15 per cent hike in regulat-
ed energy prices, the increase of the 15 per cent VAT rate to
20 per cent, the exchange rates weakening since the begin-
ning of the year, and a lesser impact of foreign competition to
mitigate inflation. All of these factors are responsible for the
significant increase in inflation during the quarter, however, it
is not yet clear as to which of these factors will fade out and
which ones will remain, and to what extent.
10
Regarding this
question, inflation expectations will play a key role, which,
according to surveys, stagnate at historically high levels. Due
to strong co-movement of these surveys with actual data, it
cannot be determined unambiguously whether they contain
relevant information on longer term inflation processes.
Rising trend in core inflation
The principle reason for the substantial leap in inflation in the
third quarter appears to be the hike in indirect taxes. As for
the core inflation factors, the increase of VAT applies almost
to all processed foods and about one-third of market servic-
es. In order to clearly conceive the basic tendencies of core
inflation it would be necessary to separate the impacts of the
aforementioned measures from the actual data.
11
According
to our calculations, the annualised monthly index reflecting
the underlying trends of core inflation was 13 per cent in
September (7-10 per cent without one-off effects), fluctuat-
ing between 5 to 10 per cent for the entire quarter. Although
the rate was rising during this period, long-term conclusions
should not be drawn from this process, because of the
impacts referred to in the introduction.
The effect of weaker exchange rates in the inflation
of industrial products
In the prices of industrial products a general rise was
observed. The higher prices of non-durables is of particu-
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2.3. Inflation trends
9
After finalising the report, the October CPI data was released. The figures basically were in line with our expectations, and hence supported the analy-
sis in the report.
10
A more detailed assessment of the above can be found in Box 2-1.
11
The technical details of the estimation procedure are contained in Box 2-1.
Chart 2-22
Consumer price index and core inflation
(yearly changes)
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Chart 2-23
Overall core inflation adjusted for tax effect*
(annualised quarterly changes)
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Chart 2-24
Inflation of industrial products and the exchange rate
(annualised quarterly changes)
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lar interest since the full spectrum of industrial goods tend
to move in tandem with its’ long-term trends. The weaker
exchange rates since March of 2006 could have a signifi-
cant impact yet it is uncertain as to whether it can be the
cause of increasing inflation dynamics in itself. 
Higher inflation in market services
The annualised quarterly index for market services
remained between 6 to 7 per cent for quite some time, and
it appears to shift in the direction of a rising trend accord-
ing to current data. The price development of this market is
presumed to be primarily dominated by wage dynamics,
with numerous other factors also involved, such as
demand and inflation expectations. According to the infor-
mation available, the changes of the unit labour costs in
the service sector and demand cannot justify in them-
selves the rising trend in the inflation of services. Thus
increasing inflation expectations may have played a key
role in acceleration of inflation in this product group. 
Inflation expectations remain elevated
There was no major adjustment in inflation expectation of
market participants after salient rise in the previous quar-
ter. It is important to note that, while household’s expecta-
tions remain remarkably elevated around 20 per cent, cor-
porate expectations are more moderate at 5-6 per cent.
Turning to developments in wage inflation, corporate lead-
ers expect stagnation while in perceived wage inflation a
further increase was observed. The qualitative index of GKI
confirms the same processes.
Prices of agricultural products continue to rise
The prices of agricultural products continued to rise during
the third quarter, and this had an impact on prices of
processed and unprocessed foods alike. This quarter
prices went up for the entire food industry by 10.1 per cent
on the average, more specifically, 17.7 per cent for
unprocessed foods and 6.4 per cent for processed foods.
The price increase is considered general in all product cat-
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Chart 2-26
Inflation expectations by corporate executives 
and households (for the next 12 months)
(Tárki and Medián corporate survey)
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Chart 2-27
Wage expectations and perceptions of corporate 
executives 
(Tárki and Medián corporate survey)
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Chart 2-25
Inflation of market services
(annualised qurterly changes)
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egories. In case of processed foods, the reason may lay in
the weakening of the temporary disinflationary effect of
stronger competition induced after Hungary’s accession to
the European Union, and the increase of indirect taxes.
12
The growing prices of basic agricultural products may be
identified as the driving factor for unprocessed foods.
Mixed effects in energy prices
There was a 15.4 per cent increase in the regulated ener-
gy prices effective as of the first of August, which had an
impact in consumer price statistics in the month of
September. This measure resulted in a massive rise in the
market prices of energies, ranging between 4.5 to 16.5 per
cent. Changes in fuel prices reflected changes in the inter-
national market. During the first two-thirds of this period
prices went up by around 5 per cent, only to drop back at
the same rate towards the end of August. This effect is sig-
nificant in itself, and taking into account the base effect, it
reduced the consumer price index for September by close
to 0.5 per cent.
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For more details see Box 2-1.
Chart 2-28
Unprocessed food price inflation
(in levels, seasonally adjusted)
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Chart 2-29
Processed food price inflation
(annualized quarterly changes)
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Box 2-1: Which factors rendered 
the measurement of underlying 
inflationary trends difficult during 
the previous quarter?
During the last quarter we were witnessed two major factors with a tan-
gible impact on prices, which tend to pose substantial difficulties for
the measurement of underlying inflationary trends. The increase in
indirect taxes in September had a direct impact, while the lesser impact
of foreign competition to mitigate inflation indirectly influenced the
basic processes in price changes. In order to be able to assess the basic
tendency, the one-off shock must be filtered out for the prior, and the
ongoing processes have to be evaluated for the latter.
Effect of the increase of indirect taxes
In the following we will analyse only core inflation items. To begin the
analysis we have separated alcohol and tobacco products from the
range of goods under review. We have estimated the technical impact
generated by the increase of VAT as 1 per cent relying on the informa-
tion conveyed in the August report. In the forthcoming we took a rel-
atively conservative approach, according to which an increase of indi-
rect taxes by 5 percentage points was adopted during a period of one
month and fully applied in consumer prices. Furthermore, we have
taken into consideration other impacts, that have the potential to
adjust the indices of underlying processes downward. Firstly, the VAT
increase may generate additional increases in the prices of products to
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For more information refer to “Quarterly Report on Inflation” (August 2006) update, Chapter 3.3: 
http://english.mnb.hu/Engine.aspx?page=mnben_infrep_en&ContentID=8817.
14
All shocks during this period made the price increase a more likely eventuality; hence, it seems reasonable to presume that the market participants
increased their prices at a higher rate than in 2004.
which the VAT increase does not directly pertain
13
, and secondly it
induced a hike in prices in excess of what is justified by the changes in
the relevant regulations. One explanation for this effect may be
offered by the substitution effect between products and the premature
implementation of prices increases. Relying on our previous estimates,
the result of these two impacts will be around 0.2 per cent, however,
the present environment may have possibly resulted in higher increas-
es.
14
All things considered, the annualised monthly rate of inflation,
intended to reflect the basic inflationary trends, was around 7-10 per
cent in September, and fluctuated between 5 to 10 per cent during the
quarter, with a rising tendency. Based on the analysis supported by
the principles set forth above, it appears that while the pass-through
in market services was complete, for processed foods it was not com-
plete but still higher than our estimate of approximately 40 per cent.
It should be emphasised that, the presumption of complete pass-
through does not reflect the empirical experiences of 2004, nor our
expectations which were adopted on this basis as indicated in the
August report, according to which during the first month following the
VAT increase only about two-thirds of the increase will actually be
applied in consumer prices. In spite of the fact that the indicators are
relatively high, real conclusions may be drawn concerning the basic
inflationary trends and long-term tendencies based on the data of the
following months.
What happened in the market of food in the past
two years?
In the price level of processed food unexpected rise was observed in
the third quarter of 2006. As an explanation, examining tendencies in
food markets of new European Union countries, regional trends can
be identified. Significant drop in price level after the EU- accession
turned into pronounced increases at the beginning of the year. This
tendency is even more relevant for Hungary. Extreme effects can be
observed both in the case of the initially increased competition and the
following adjustment process. This process can most likely be attrib-
uted to interaction of changes in market structure and costs.
After Hungary’s accession to the European Union, competition became
more intense. This was felt through two channels: one was that more
participants entered the market, and the other was the expansion in the
selection of goods. The latter comprised mostly of the lower priced prod-
ucts of other recently joined countries, that also paved the way for price
increases at a lower rate. The aforementioned two impacts resulted in
lower price levels. This process was apparent mostly in the prices of
processed foods that, practically speaking, were almost unchanged for
an extended period. However, based on the facts of the last six months
a regional phenomenon appears to be emerging, namely that the short-
term disinflationary effect of stronger competition is gradually fading.
Higher prices of raw materials (unprocessed food, oil prices and
exchange rate pass-through) may decrease profit margins at stable con-
sumer prices. According to upward tending data, in all likelihood com-
panies are no longer willing to reduce their profit margins to compen-
sate on the cost side for the pressure to price increases (nor do they have
the capacity to improve efficiency). 
Regarding future developments, it is of high importance to identify
whether the hike in foods inflation to this extent is the beginning of a
persistent, long term process or a temporary effect only. Possible
explanations imply the following. If the changed market structure –
enabling higher increases in profit margins and prices – resulted in
immediate adjustment, the process unambiguously points towards
higher long term inflation. On the contrary, it is also possible that cost
factors passed through to prices more dynamically than expected. In
this case we are facing a correction implied by higher costs which, in
the longer run, does neither influence the dynamics of inflation, nor the
development of profit margins. A third explanation could be that the
elevated inflation expectation led to higher price increases. This would
make it impossible to determine the direction of changes in inflation
and profit margins. It cannot be ruled out that the rise in inflation
expectations is temporary only and expectations will return to previous
moderate levels. Data released in the following months will help to
decide which explanation will prove to be relevant for this process. 
Chart 2-30
Harmonized indices of processed food prices
(monthly data, annual rate of change)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ja
n.
 0
2
M
ar
.
M
ay
Ju
ly
S
ep
.
N
ov
.
Ja
n.
 0
3
M
ar
.
M
ay
Ju
ly
S
ep
.
N
ov
.
Ja
n.
 0
4
M
ar
.
M
ay
ju
ly
S
ep
.
N
ov
.
Ja
n.
 0
5
M
ar
.
M
ay
Ju
ly
S
ep
.
N
ov
.
Ja
n.
 0
6
M
ar
.
M
ay
Ju
ly
Per cent
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Per cent
Hungary
Central European Countries
Baltic Countries
Cyprus, Malta

3. Outlook for inflation 
and the real economy

According to our November forecast, during the next two
years economic growth is expected to slow down consid-
erably and starting from middle next year inflation is
expected to drop.
15
The economic path will be dominated,
on the one hand, by cost increasing effects of government
measures and the exchange rate and by the income-
decreasing, demand-lowering effects of fiscal tightening,
on the other. In the short run, rising inflation will be domi-
nant, caused by costs increases (higher taxes and contri-
butions) and by the weakening of the currency since the
beginning of the year. Later, demand effects will gradually
strengthen, and the economy will slow down, which will
have a disinflationary effect in the second half of our fore-
cast horizon, though it can only partly counterbalance the
inflationary pressure of the cost shocks. In certain goods
markets the fading effects of the price-constraining com-
petition following EU accession will mean an additional
inflationary factor. 
According to the baseline scenario, inflation will continue
to rise until the second quarter of 2007, then it will gradu-
ally decline. However, on the entire forecast horizon the
rate of inflation is expected to exceed the medium-term tar-
get. The symmetrical risk distribution around the forecast’s
baseline scenario is in essence a reflection of the uncer-
tainty stemming from inflation expectations that are pre-
sumed to increase in recent months. The baseline scenario
was based on the assumption of well-anchored expecta-
tions. 
Growth rate is expected to substantially fall behind
its full potential in 2007-08 
The outlook for economic activity – in line with what is con-
tained in the August Report – indicates that economic
growth is expected to slow down significantly from the 4 to
5 per cent rate that we have seen during the past few
years. In the next two years, the growth rate of the
Hungarian economy will be considerably less than its full
potential: after more than a decade, the output gap will
remain negative for some time. According to our forecast,
in 2007 and 2008 economic growth is projected in the
neighbourhood of 2.5 per cent, while this year the growth
rate will be around its potential thanks to the robust growth
achieved during the first six months. According to our cal-
culations the considerable slowdown will already begin in
the second half of this year, and the lower turning point of
the cycle is expected to materialise in the middle of next
year. However, it will not bring about a notable turn for the
better, as in 2008 only moderate improvement can be
expected, hence the negative output gap will prevail over
the longer run.
A slowdown in external economic activity is pro-
jected 
In recent years the Hungarian economy relied predomi-
nantly on brisk economic activity in Europe. In European
growth, investments play an important role, and this has
made its beneficial impact on the Hungarian economy felt
through the dynamic growth of industrial production and
export sales. 
Following the dynamic growth this year, the growth rate in
Europe is expected to slow down as of 2007, and most
long-term projections and forecasts have taken an
unfavourable turn during the past few months. Economic
activity within the euro area, and in particular in Germany,
is characterised by two trends: according to the latest indi-
cators of economic activity (IFO and EABCI indices) busi-
ness confidence is extremely high at the present, however,
on the half-year horizon economic activity is expected to
decelerate considerably. 
Looking forward, in parallel with the changes in external
economic activity, the growth rate of exports is expected to
slow down following the outstanding rate in 2006. The
moderate growth in domestic demand and the slowdown
in exports will also moderate import growth rates.
Diminishing investments 
The data from recent quarters on corporate investments
and capacity utilisation indicate that the domestic business
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Our forecast is based on data and information available by November 8.
Chart 3-1
Annual and quarterly growth rate of the gross domestic
product
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sector did not look upon the strong economic activity
around Europe as lasting, and investment activity
remained moderate despite an all-time high rate of capac-
ity utilisation. Accordingly, the effect of slower external
economic activity will be mitigated in gross fixed capital
formation: the dynamics of investments by the business
sector will be reduced somewhat, but we expect the
growth rate to stabilise around 4 per cent in the following
two years. Profit expectations deteriorating due to increas-
ing tax burdens also point toward slower investment
dynamics.
The substantial decline in construction during the second
quarter of 2006 clearly demonstrates that housing and
government investments are expected to slow down con-
siderably. In our view, the reduction of income in the
households will manifest itself in declining housing invest-
ment this year, which will continue over the next two years
as well, with the largest drop forecasted for next year. The
unfavourable outlook is underpinned by the drop in the
number of building permits issued and in the number of
new homes completed this year. All in all, the volume of
housing investment is expected to drop by close to 20 per
cent in 2008 compared to the all-time high in 2004. 
As far as government investments are concerned, the
largest slowdown is expected in this sector after the strong
growth in 2005, which may be made even worse over the
short term by the delays of highway constructions which
were originally planned to be completed this year. At the
same time, according to our forecast, the increasing avail-
ability of EU funds is expected to boost growth in the gov-
ernment sector from 2008. 
As a result of the strongly different investment behaviour of
the three sectors, this year and the next investment dynam-
ics are expected to lag behind the rate of economic
growth, whereas in 2008 investments may expand at a rate
somewhat higher than GDP.
Substantial loss of income and declining consump-
tion 
In projecting the behaviour of the household sector,
decreases in real income will provide the starting point.
There are a number of reasons behind the reduction in dis-
posable income over the short term. One is the govern-
ment measures for increasing taxes and contributions, and
the other is that gross real wages and other revenues of
households will also decline; while the real value of finan-
cial transfers remains constant. In consequence of the
changes in the legal environment, next year net wages will
drop by about 3 per cent in relation to gross wages by
comparison to the first half of 2006. As far as gross real
wages are concerned, a two per cent decline is forecast-
ed for 2007, after the steady growth of last years, on the
average for the entire economy. However, in 2008 income
will be back on the rise, if ever so mildly, due to the fade
away of tax effects and a slowdown in inflation. 
In the August Report we addressed in detail the expected
consumption behaviour of households, and we highlighted
key economics considerations.
16
At times of decreases in
income, the path of consumption is primarily determined
by whether changes in income expectations are expected
to prevail, by liquidity constraints, and by precaution
motives in the wake of uncertainty. Taking these factors
into consideration, our view on the expected smoothing of
consumption has not changed materially during the past
months. In our forecast we stand by our previous position,
namely that the consumption of households will fluctuate
less than incomes. Accordingly, next year the rate of
decline in consumption will remain behind the rate of
decrease of incomes, and in 2008 consumption will stag-
nate, while incomes will take a turn for the better. 
Higher consumption smoothing can occur than our base-
line scenario, if the households view the decrease in dis-
posal income that is expected for next year as being tem-
porary, after the steady rise in income in recent years.
Additionally, the easing of liquidity constraints, rapid
expansion of loan products as recently experienced in the
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Chart 3-2
GDP growth and contributions by the various components
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For more details see Box 2-1 in the August Report. 
financial sector, and simplifying loan applications could
also constitute additional reasons.
However, more moderate smoothing is indicated by the
fact that the low rate of financial savings tend to enhance
precautionary motives. Another reason for more moderate
smoothing is that the consumption/income ratio is already
high by international comparison. 
In light of the mutual risks we should point out that in the
outlook for real economy the degree of smoothing of con-
sumption continues to constitute the most significant
uncertainty. In consideration of the fact that consumption
has a decisive weight in GDP, if consumption deviates
from the main scenario it may have a substantial impact on
economic growth as well. 
Increasing risks in wage developments 
The starting point of our wage projection is that wage
dynamics will take a different path in the general govern-
ment and in the private sector during the next two years.
Relying on the presumption that the government wage bill
will be frozen for a two-year period as planned by the gov-
ernment, we forecast a minimal increase, in the private
sector we based our calculations on labour market trends
and developments in the real economy. 
Estimated developments in labour supply and demand will
sustain the current loose labour market conditions.
Demographic reasons and stricter pension regulations equal-
ly contribute to the increase of the rate of activity and supply
in the labour market. Increasing demand on the labour mar-
ket, however, appears to be very limited in the next two years,
due to slowing economic growth and increasing tax burdens. 
In spite of a loose labour market, according to the latest infor-
mation available the nominal wage path projected for the next
two years has risen in the private sector. In contrast with pre-
vious expectations, there was no decline in wage dynamics in
the last months, as explained in detail in section 2.
Nonetheless, with regard to the very high figures for the last
month, it should be noted that they most likely contain the
impact generated by the sudden surge in bonus payments,
which presumably reflects payments brought forward in light
of tax and contribution increases. The increase in employers’
contributions also contributes to higher labour costs, thus in
2007, despite the mild decrease in average wage dynamics,
the growth rate of nominal labour costs in the private sector
will remain constant. 
Differing sectoral developments are behind the aggregate
picture characterised by higher wages. In the manufactur-
ing industry, the higher nominal wages do not bring about
any inflation pressure. Since production has grown rapidly,
unit labour costs will be lower this year, and will grow at
only a modest rate in 2008. In the case of market services,
however, the situation is different: unit labour costs will
keep growing at high rates, and hence they will lead to sig-
nificant inflation pressure. The primary reason for this, is
that no sizeable adjustment is expected in wages, nor in
the size of workforce – attributed to rigid labour market
positions – despite the forecast for a moderate increase of
value added in the sector. 
In forecasting the wage path the role of nominal wage
expectations must also be taken into consideration. This
factor is currently of special importance due to the sub-
stantial increases in price levels, in the wake of one-off
price shocks. In the baseline scenario, we stand by our
previous position, namely that labour market participants
will – following the practices of previous years – “overlook”
the one-off inflationary shocks caused by the increase in
indirect taxes. In 2008, however, nominal wages will be
adjusted to decreasing inflation only to a lesser extent due
to backward-looking wage setting. 
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Chart 3-3
Consumption/income ratio 
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Chart 3-4
Unit labour costs in the manufacturing industry and in the
market service sector 
(annualised quarterly growth)
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The wage dynamics of previous months and inflationary
developments indicate rising trends in risks concerning
next year’s wages. The risks stemming from changes in
expectations – pointing toward higher nominal wages – are
captured as inflation uncertainty, rather than generating
changes in the baseline scenario. 
All in all, in the baseline scenario there will be a slight
decrease in wage growth in the private sector in 2007-
2008, however, the process will commence at a level
above 8 per cent, somewhat higher than previously esti-
mated. Simultaneously, we foresee some increase in the
upward risks stemming from wage expectations, displayed
in uncertainty around the baseline path. 
Inflation gradually decreasing from the high above
8 per cent
In the period ending in 2008, apart from the estimated
developments in the real economy, the impact generated
by government measures will also substantially influence
the inflation path. In the short run, inflation is expected to
further increase rapidly, followed by a gradual slowing
process in the second half of 2007; nevertheless, the fore-
cast indicates a CPI around 4 per cent at the end of the
forecast period. According to our forecast, the yearly aver-
age inflation will be approximately 7 per cent in 2007, and
4 per cent in 2008. At the same time, core inflation shows
a continuously decreasing trend from mid-2007 until the
end of our forecast horizon, core inflation will be below 4
per cent in the second half of 2008. The difference in the
forecasted path of CPI and core inflation is explained by
our assumptions on regulated prices. 
In September the effect of government measures – indi-
rect tax increases (discounted VAT rate, excise duty) and
the increases in regulated prices – appear in the price
index. As the starting point of the forecast, it is important
to note that increase in inflation in the third quarter sur-
passed what was expected in connection with one-off
items. The higher rate of actual inflation tends to have an
unfavourable impact on the inflation outlook, mostly at the
short end of the forecast horizon. At the same time, long-
term expectations are fixed in the baseline scenario, and
thus higher initial price level does not lead to lasting infla-
tionary pressure. 
In addition to the unfavourable initial situation, high unit
labour costs also contribute to higher inflation, especially in
the case of service sector prices. From the standpoint of
the inflation outlook, the major assumptions used for our
forecast took a clearly turn for the better in recent months.
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2005 2006 2007 2008
Private sector
Average wage 6.9 8.3 7.3 7.0
Unit labour costs 2.2 5.3 5.6 4.7
General government*
Average wage 12.8 5.4 1.5 0.4
National economy*
Average wage 8.9 7.2 5.3 4.7
Table 3-1
Wage projection
* Cash-based approach.
06 Q1 06 Q2 06 Q3 06 Q4 07 Q1 07 Q2 07 Q3 07 Q4 08 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4
Core inflation 0.8 1.1 2.9 5.0 6.8 7.1 6.1 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.6
Consumer price index 2.5 2.6 4.1 6.3 8.4 8.2 6.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0
Annual average core 
inflation 2.4 6.1 4.0
Annual average price 
index 3.9 6.9 4.1
Table 3-2
Inflation forecast 
A further significant increase in inflation is expected in the
next two quarters, with inflation possibly peaking at over
8.5 per cent next spring. In the first quarter of 2007, infla-
tion rate will be almost 6 percentage points higher than in
the same period of 2006. From the second quarter a grad-
ual decline may occur. Inflation may decrease to nearly 4
per cent by early 2008, with then the year-on-year figure
remaining around this level for a longer period. At the same
time, core inflation shows a continuous decline in 2008,
and by the and of the year quarter on quarter core inflation
rates might come close to 3 percent. The difference
between core inflation and CPI are essentially caused by
our assumptions for administered prices.
The impact of government measures has a smaller effect
on the longer-term inflationary outlook, and the importance
of economic relationships, based on market mechanisms,
is gradually increasing. One of the most relevant relation-
ships is between unit labour costs and core inflation. Chart
3-5 illustrates well, that trend inflation, adjusted for volatile
elements and price level effects of indirect price changes,
moves together with unit labour costs in the private sector.
This close relationship also suggests that, after a steep
rise, trend inflation is expected to decrease continuously
from mid-2007 through to the end of our forecast horizon.
It is worth noting that unit labour costs are permanently
higher than trend inflation on our forecast horizon, indicat-
ing lower profit margins, which is in line with weaker
domestic demand. 
In our view, the slowdown in economic activity and the
reduction of demand will have a disinflationary effect simi-
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Box 3-1: Assumptions
In accordance with the past practices which we have been following for
quite some time, we prepared a conditional macroeconomic forecast.
Accordingly, we used a fixed path for the following variables: the
EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rate, the MNB base rate and long-
term yields, and the forward price of Brent crude oil. In calculating
the budget deficit we relied on interest payments as shown in the mar-
ket yield curve. As regards the measures taken by the government, we
took into account the first version of the budget act draft and official
announcements.
As regards regulated prices it should by noted that in those cases (e.g.
household gas prices, district heat and interurban public transport)
where no final government decision has been made, our assumption
relating to the extent and timing of the price increases has not
changed. 
By comparison to previous quarter’s report, some key variables have
changed significantly. Changes in basic components – primarily the reduc-
tion of oil prices and appreciation of the exchange rate by almost 4 per cent
– point to significantly lower inflation. However, these favourable impacts
will not apply evenly over the forecast horizon for more than two years.
The stronger exchange rate is expected to be a significant disinflationary
factor in 2007 and 2008, while lower oil prices will have a mitigating effect
on inflation this year, and the next to a lesser degree. The reduction of spot
oil prices changed the forward oil price path, including its slope, and –
viewed as a technical impact – will slightly increase inflation in 2008. 
Apart from the impact of the main assumptions, the estimated path of
regulated prices also points toward slightly lower inflation: the
changes in telecommunications regulations scheduled to take effect in
2007, and the restructuring of the system of subsidising medicine
prices has the potential to reduce inflation in 2007 by close to 0.3 per-
centage points on the whole, in comparison to our previous forecast. 
Table 3-3
Changes in major assumptions relative to the August Report*
Augusztus 2006 Current
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Central bank base rate (%)** 6.75 6.75 6.75 8.0 8.0 8.0
EUR/HUF exchange rate 269 277.6 277.6 265.9 267.3 267.3
USD/EUR exchange rate (cent) 124.9 126.9 126.9 124.9 126.2 126.2
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 70.3 76.3 74.6 65.1 64.8 67.2
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 15,144 16,696 16,329 13,860 13,722 14,228
* Yearly averages, based on the October exchange rate and futures oil prices.
** End-of-year value.
lar to the previous quarter. In connection with these long-
term effects, we believe that consumption smoothing and
the negative output gap forecast for 2007-2008 will have
greater impact in inflation in 2008.
Symmetrical inflation and growth risks
As for the main scenario described above, we were able to
quantify the impact of five uncertainty factors, which have
the potential to influence inflation or growth during the
2007-2008 period. Hence, we have examined the impacts
stemming from inflation expectations, the smoothing of
consumption, the disinflationary effect of aggregate
demand, the implementation of government measures,
and from the uncertainty surrounding the rate and timing of
increases in gas prices. 
Of the most common uncertainty factors, inflation expecta-
tions and their impact on wage agreements and price set-
ting are the most important. Based on the macroeconomic
figures of past months, inflation expectations are now more
likely to increase in connection with massive, one-off price
increases, and consequently the nominal path of the econ-
omy may take, and remain on a different path from that
presented previously. In contrast with our previous
assumptions, risks stemming from expectations may
emerge in the near future and, consequently, they may
substantially influence the 2007 inflation path. As men-
tioned earlier, in accordance with our adopted modelling
and forecasting practice, these risks will materialize in risk
distribution rather than in the baseline scenario. 
On the whole, we are of the opinion that the potential
increase in expectations and stagnation at a high level con-
stitutes the largest upward inflation risk over the next two
years. The implementation risk of fiscal measures not yet
adopted – first and foremost the proposed two-year wage
bill freeze – is expected to surface in 2008 as an additional
inflationary factor. Nevertheless, if the disinflationary effect of
the negative output gap proves to be stronger, it will likely
result in lower inflation in both years compared to the base-
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Chart 3-5
Trend inflation* and unit labour costs
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Chart 3-6
Inflation forecast fan chart*
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The central,
darkest area containing the central projection for the consumer price index
illustrated by the white dotted line (as the mode of distribution) refers to 30
per cent of the probability. The year-end points and the continuous, horizon-
tal line from 2007 show the value of the announced inflation targets.
Chart 3-7
GDP growth fan chart*
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line scenario. Lower inflation may also be seen if consump-
tion smoothing turns out to be lower, i.e. if household con-
sumption falls more strongly than we expect, or if the price
of natural gas and district heating is increased at a rate
below projections, to reach the level of world market prices
at a later date. 
In light of the above, we envisage close to symmetrical
inflation risks for 2007-2008 around the baseline.
Accordingly, relying on the baseline scenario above the
inflation target, if our main assumptions are realised, sub-
stantial risks remain that the inflation rate will be above
price stability in 2008. 
In connection with the GDP forecast, we envisage slightly
downside risks for next year, mainly due to lower consump-
tion. In essence, risks will remain symmetrical in 2008,
when the impact of lower consumption may be offset by
looser fiscal policy (higher wage increase in the govern-
ment sector). 
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4. Background information

Compared to the August Inflation Report, we expect that
the rate of price increase will be slightly higher this year,
and project a slightly lower rate for both next year and
2008. Accordingly, we raise our forecast for average annu-
al inflation by 0.1 percentage point for 2006, and reduce it
by 0.1 percentage point for 2007 and 2008.
Our view on inflation developments – in terms of the rele-
vant magnitudes – has not changed, meaning that the
slight deterioration in the inflation outlook results from the
improvement in certain assumptions employed in our pro-
jection in conjunction with less favourable actual data.
This duality applies to our entire forecast horizon: the first
part is dominated by a higher-than-expected rise in infla-
tion in tandem with lower oil price-path over the short
term, while over the medium term cost inflationary pres-
sure and a stronger forint exchange rate generates an
opposite effect.
The moderate inflationary environment characteristic of
the early part of 2006 ended in the summer, as reflected
by the gradual rise in core inflation data from June on.
Although the impact of the change in the VAT rate is still
uncertain for September, trend inflation is significantly
higher than anticipated and this indicates an inflationary
environment that will undoubtedly be higher over the
short term. Furthermore, the unexpectedly high data seen
in recent months also point to higher inflation expecta-
tions. At the same time, to some extent the increase in
core inflation may be due to the fact that the change in
the VAT rate presented an opportunity for sellers to com-
pensate for cost pressure that is presumed to have
increased recently, and to implement price increases
sooner than planned.
Similar to inflation data, wage figures for July and August also
turned out to be higher than expected. These data are also
difficult to assess due to the changes implemented in
September, such as the regulations concerning employee’s
contribution. At the same time, the decline in productivity in
the service sector also induced rising wage costs. Even
though in our baseline projection we assumed that – due to
the credibility of the inflation targeting policy – the recent
unfavourable data would not affect inflation expectations, in
light of the latest wage figures our previous forecast for private
sector wages had to be increased slightly for each year. All in
all, relative to our August projection, the effect of wage costs
on prices may result in higher inflation in 2007 and 2008.
Since in our baseline scenario we assumed anchored
inflation expectations, after some interim period the rate
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4.1. Background information on the projections
* Annual averages on the basis of the average exchange rate in effect in October 2006 and the forward oil price path.
** Year-end figures.
August 2006 Current
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Central bank base rate (%)** 6.75 6.75 6.75 8.00 8.00 8.00
EUR/HUF exchange rate 269 277.6 277.6 265.9 267.3 267.3
EUR/USD exchange rate (US cent) 124.9 126.9 126.9 124.9 126.2 126.2
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 70.3 76.3 74.6 65.1 64.8 67.2
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 15,144 16,696 16,329 13,860 13,722 14,228
Table 4-1
Changes in major assumptions relative to the August Report*
Chart 4-1
Changes in our projection of core inflation*
(annualized quarterly changes)
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* Without direct VAT effects.
of increase in prices may return to the level we previous-
ly projected, despite the unfavourable new data (see
chart 4-1). Therefore, any coordination failure risks con-
cerning inflation expectations are accounted for in the fan
chart.
As for the assumptions used in the forecast, the oil price
path and the exchange rate – fixed at close to 4 per cent
stronger than before – both result in a slower increase in
prices. One difference between the two is that while the
cheaper oil has a mitigating effect on inflation in 2006 and
2007, the stronger forint only has an impact on inflation in
2007 and 2008.
As there was no new information on regulated prices, we
essentially used our assumptions from the August Inflation
Report.
17
Next year, as far as regulated prices are con-
cerned, the reduction in carrier prices in the telecommuni-
cations sector and the new elements of pharmaceutical
subsidies will provide a further decline in inflation relative
to August.
However, a significant change in our assumptions regard-
ing government sector wages was made compared to the
previous Report. Namely, we assumed the freezing of the
total wage bills instead of the average wage. This resulted
in a one-and-a-half per cent increase in public sector
wages, in 2007. Higher than previously assumed public
sector wages had a primary impact on household income
in 2007, and thus it increased consumption and GDP fig-
ures slightly, but its effect on the inflation rate turned out to
be negligible.
As far as developments in the real economy are con-
cerned, in addition to household consumption, we have
reconsidered our outlook for gross fixed capital formation
as well. Based on the latest figures, we revised downward
our projection for short-run corporate investment, whilst
over the medium term we maintained a moderate increase
similar to our previous forecast. Due to the favourable
recent data, while using practically the same path for exter-
nal demand as in our previous Report, the contribution of
net exports to growth increases in 2007, but decreases in
2008. Based on these two impacts, our projection of GDP
growth for 2007 was as much as 0.1 percentage point
higher, whereas in 2008 both impacts will slightly slow
down the economy, leading to a 0.1 percentage point
lower projected rate of growth.
18
Impacts of an alternative interest and exchange rate
path
We analysed the effects that adopting the average expected
exchange rate and interest rate of the November Reuters sur-
vey as our underlying assumption would have had on our
baseline projection. According to the survey, analysts antici-
pate the forint to appreciate by nearly 3.5 per cent (a forint-
euro of around 259) by the end of 2007, relative to the
assumption in our baseline scenario. At the same time, they
also expect the central bank base rate to be lowered by
approximately 80 basis points. Applying these assumptions
our inflation forecast would be 0.3 percentage points lower for
2007 and 0.4 percentage points lower in 2008. The impact of
GDP growth would be smaller, it would decrease by 0.1 per-
centage point in 2007 and by 0.15 percentage points in 2008.
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To the best of our knowledge, up to the date when data collection for the Report was closed, no final decision had been made concerning the increase
of energy and transportation prices for next year.
18
Regarding the projection of the real economy it is important to note that according to the revision of GDP data, as published by the CSO on 2 October
2006, we calculated all deficit and balance figures using the revised annual data, whereas quarterly figures are based on the former methodology, as
no revised quarterly data is available at this time.
Table 4-2
Key factors affecting our inflation forecast
Result in higher inflation Result in lower inflation
• Higher impact of VAT increase • Decline in the forward oil price path
Short term
in September
• Additional price increases parallel 
with the VAT increase 
• Higher wage path • Appreciated forint exchange rate assumption
Long term • Increase of the slope of forward • Dropping household income levels
oil price path
• Regulated prices
The MNB’s main scenario versus other projections
With regards to inflation, most of the analysts and insti-
tutions forecast a somewhat slower pace; nevertheless,
our baseline projection lies within the range of the ana-
lysts for both years. Our projection for GDP growth,
however, is entirely in line with other forecasts, and the
same is true for expected budget and current account
deficits.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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Chart 4-2
Exchange rate assumptions based on Reuters survey 
prepared in November and the fixed rate projection*
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Chart 4-3
Central bank base rate assumptions based on Reuters 
survey prepared in November and the fixed rate projection
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Table 4-3
Changes in central projections relative to August 
(average percentage changes on a year earlier, unless otherwise indicated)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Actual
Projection
August Current August Current August Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation
1
2.2 2.0 2.4 5.6 6.1 4.4 4.0
Consumer price index 3.6 3.8 3.9 7.0 6.9 4.2 4.1
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
Impact of fiscal demand
2
0.8 1.8 1.5 -4.1 -4.2 -1.7 -2.0
Household consumption
3
2.1 2.5 2.4 -1.0 -0.9 -0.3 0.0
Memo: Household consumption expenditure
3
1.8 2.6 2.4 -0.9 -0.7 0.0 0.3
Fixed capital formation
3
6.6 6.3 4.2 2.0 2.1 4.3 4.3
Domestic absorption
3
0.8 1.5** 0.9** -0.2** 0.0** 1.1 1.4
Export
3
10.8 13.7 15.7 9.5 9.8 9.4 9.1
Import
3,4
6.5 10.8** 12.1** 6.9** 7.4** 8.3 8.4
GDP
3
4.1 (4.3)* 3.9 3.9 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4
Current account deficit
4
As a percentage of GDP 6.8 8.1** 7.1** 5.9** 5.5** 4.7 4.3
EUR billions 6.0 7.0** 6.2** 5.3** 5.2** 4.5 4.3
External financing requirement
4
As a percentage of GDP 6.0 6.9** 6.0** 4.5** 4.1** 3.0 2.6
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings
5
8.9 6.8 7.2 4.4 5.3 4.5 4.7
Whole-economy employment
6
0.0 0.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.3
Private sector gross average earnings 6.9 7.9 8.3 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0
Private sector employment
6
0.3 1.0 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5
Private sector unit labour cost 2.2 4.3 5.3 4.3 5.6 3.9 4.7
Household real income 3.6*** 4.3 2.5 -4.3 -3.8 2.0 1.7
1
For technical reasons, the indicator that we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it follows a
similar trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
Actual data does not
contain the impact of the CSO national balance revision received on 2nd of October 
4
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics,
from 2004 actual current account deficit and external financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such
figures. 
5
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
6
According to the CSO labour force survey.
* Adjusted for calendar effect. ** Our projection includes the impact of the Hungarian Army’s Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and
increases public consumption and imports. *** An MNB estimate.
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Table 4-4
MNB’s main scenario versus other projections
2006 2007
Consumer price index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB 3.9 6.9
Consensus Economics (September 2006)
1
3.4–3.7–4.0 5.5–6.4–7.0
OECD (May 2006) 2.1 2.9
European Commission (Autumn 2006) 3.9 6.8
IMF (September 2006) 3.5 5.8
Reuters-survey (November 2006)
1
3.7–3.9–4.0 5.8–6.5–7.3
World Bank (September 2006) 3.7 6.5
GDP (annual growth, %)
MNB 3.9 2.5
Consensus Economics (September 2006)
1
3.6–3.8–4.0 1.8–2.4–3.0
OECD (May 2006) 4.6 4.4
European Commission (Autumn 2006) 4.0 2.4
IMF (September 2006) 4.5 3.5
Reuters-survey (November 2006)
1
3.6–3.9–4.3 1.8–2.4–3.1
World Bank (September 2006) 3.8 2.5
Current account deficit (EUR billion)
MNB 6.2* 5.3*
Consensus Economics (September 2006)
1,2
5.8–6.6–7.2 5.1–6.1–7.8
Reuters-survey (November 2006)
1
5.8–6.5–7.8 5.2–6.5–6.6
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 7.2* 5.8*
OECD (May 2006) 7.7 7.3
European Commission (Autumn 2006) 7.3 5.1
IMF (September 2006) 9.1 8.0
World Bank (September 2006) 8.0 6.7
Budget deficit (ESA-95 method, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 9.5–10.4** 6.1–7.7**
Consensus Economics (September 2006)
1
8.6–10.0–11.0 5.7–6.8–7.5
European Commission (Autumn 2006) 10.1 7.4
Reuters-survey (November 2006)
1
9.5–10.0–10.2 5.9–6.6–7.4
World Bank (September 2006) 8.6 5.1
Forecasts of the size of Hungary’s export markets
MNB 9.1 4.0
OECD (May 2006)
3
7.9 6.9
European Commission (Autumn 2006)
3
9.1 6.3
IMF (September 2006)
3
8.1 5.7
Forecasts of GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners
MNB 2.9 2.2
OECD (May 2006)
3
2.6 2.5
European Commission (Autumn 2006)
3
3.1 2.4
IMF (September 2006)
3
2.8 2.3
MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections. 
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’
responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated for the Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate dispersion. 
2
The sur-
vey specifies current account projections in US dollars, therefore they are converted at the EUR/USD exchange rate assumed in the current Report. 
3
Values calculated by the
MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the MNB’s own external demand indicators.
This way, the forecast may differ from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions. * Our projection takes account of the negative effect on the current account resulting
from the Gripen fighter procurement. ** Risk domain related to the ESA deficit, which contains risks relating to the measures announced under the New Equilibrium program.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (September 2006); European Commission Economic Forecasts, Autumn 2006; IMF World
Economic Outlook (September 2006); Reuters survey, November 2006, World Bank EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (September 2006); OECD Economic Outlook (May 2006).
In drawing up the budget projection we relied on the draft
bill for the 2007 budget act, on the updated convergence
program submitted in September and on Government
announcements. For the purposes of the projection budg-
et items are identified in the following three groups based
on the information available:
1. we will forecast the impacts of the measures – regard-
less of whether they were known before or adopted
recently – that were enacted into law and primarily
intended to increase revenues, based on our own calcu-
lations consistent with MNB’s macroeconomic projec-
tion. This category covers tax and contribution increas-
es for the most part. 
2. in connection with any measures that were already
announced, but not yet enacted into law, we accepted
the Government’s forecasts if there was any available. In
other words, in the absence of detailed information we
assumed that the Government will to realise its meas-
ures in a way that their impact on deficit will be identical
with the Government’s latest forecast. This category
includes, among others, the doctor’s consultation fee or
the expenditures of budgetary units.
3. the items carrying the largest degree of uncertainty are
the ones which have already been announced but not
yet enacted into law, and no official forecast is available
with respect to their budgetary impact.
19
These items are
impact of restructuring the natural gas compensation
scheme or the system of subsidising medicine prices,
and the impact of reforms in the healthcare system. In
these cases we applied our own assumptions regarding
certain input variables and the foreseeable budgetary
impacts.
The deficit targets set out in the convergence program as
submitted in September may be achieved if the
Government manages to implement all measures it con-
tains. Implementation, however, is burdened with risks
prone to increase in time. According to our baseline pro-
jection the ESA deficit for 2006 is estimated to be around
9.9 per cent of the GDP, while the ESA deficit for 2007 is
expected to be around 6.5 to 7.7 per cent of the GDP. We
have defined the range for 2007 under the assumption that
if budgetary developments will be favourable next year,
and if deficit drops below 6.5 per cent of the GDP, the
Government will spend the so called contingency reserves
set aside in the budget (for further information see below).
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4.2. Developments in general government
deficit indicators
19
The cut-off date of our projection was the 8-th of November. Note that our results are not changed by the Constitutional Court’s decision on the tax of
companies’ petty cash, since this was excluded from our baseline projection as a measure with high risks.
Forecast
2006 2007 2008
1) GFS balance -9.5 -6.5 -4.0*
2) ESA balance adjustments -0.4 0.0 -0.2
3) ESA balance (1+2) -9.9 -6.5 -4.2
4) ESA-balance with risks ** (-9.5)-(-10.4) (-6.1)-(-7.7) (-3.4)-(-5.3)
5) Quasi fiscal expenditures and other adjustments -1.2 -0.4 -0.7
6) Augmented (SNA) balance (1+5)*** -10.7 -6.9 -4.9
7) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -6.8 -2.7 -0.7
9) Impact of fiscal demand +1.5 -4.2 -2.0
Table 4-5
Fiscal deficit indicators in our baseline scenario 
(as a percentage of GDP)
* As we have no budget bill 2008 for this year we estimated the level of various deficit indicators on the basis of completion of the measures outlined in the con-
vergence programme. 
** Range of risks related to the ESA deficit, which contains our risk assessment relating to the convergence program. The range of risks related to the ESA deficit
for 2007 was defined in consideration of the allocation of contingency reserves to the extent required according to the budgetary trends.
*** The cash-based deficit of the general government minus extraordinary revenues and expenditures, and including quasi fiscal operations settled outside the
general government (MNB estimate). 
The deficit for 2008 is expected under the baseline sce-
nario to settle around the 4.3 per cent deficit level as it is
targeted in the convergence program, however, the major
part of the distribution of risks will exceed the deficit target.
Compared to the baseline projection contained in the
August inflation report, the current projection indicates a
lower deficit by 0.2 percentage points for 2006, and high-
er deficits by 0.3 and 0.1 percentage points for 2007 and
2008, respectively.
The 2007 budget outlines a realistic fiscal plan but limited
reserves compared to risks. In recent years the
Government frequently failed to meet the deficit target set
out in the budget act, so the 2007 budget contain higher
than before reserves in order to meet the deficit target
specified. In the 2007 budget act the Government set
aside a total of 225 billion forints in reserves to meet the
deficit target safely, however, the reserves actually avail-
able remains significantly behind (for more details see the
box below). According to previous years experience, the
general and earmarked reserves set aside in the budget
will be spent in all likelihood. In other words, only the addi-
tional approximately 130 billion contingency reserves can
be realistically counted on as collateral reserves in light of
the experiences of previous years. Since according to our
central projection the deficit – not counting the reserves –
will be 0.2 percentage points higher than what is contained
in the budget act, it means an additional 50 billion forints
less from the reserves actually available. Furthermore, the
usual uncertainty concerning the forecast of the deficit of
local governments outside the scope of direct control by
the central budget constitutes an additional 0.1-0.2 per-
centage points risk factor, concerning the implementation
of which the Government will have any information only
after the end of the year to which the budget pertains. More
specifically, the amount of the reserves that may be dis-
posed of during the course of the year in the event of any
unfavourable turn of events in the budget, that is effective-
ly available is estimated around 30-55 billion forints instead
of the 225 billion forints shown in the Government’s plans. 
Budgetary developments in 2006
Due to the significant exceeding of expenditure limits, in
spite of the measures introduced during the year to reduce
the deficit, the ESA deficit of private pension funds may
reach 9.9 per cent of the GDP, without adjustments,
instead of 6.1 per cent as planned. Our baseline projection
predicts a deficit level the 0.2 percentage points lower rel-
ative to the August forecast, attributed for the most part to
the higher than expected tax revenues for the third quarter. 
Close to one-third on the 4 per cent excess of 2006 deficit
targets may be tied to statistical methodology reasons and
the remaining two-thirds to a budget policy that turned out
be looser than planned. The ESA deficit target set for 2006
fundamentally deviate from that number which were justi-
fied by both the budgetary trends and the statistical
methodology employed by Eurostat. The accrual-based
accounting of the costs of Gripen fighter purchases and
highway construction costs should have to be taken into
account when defining the ESA deficit target. This way the
statistically correct accrual-based accounting of deficit tar-
get would have been around 7.5 per cent of the GDP.
Therefore, exceeding the deficit relative to the proposed
budgetary path is realistically estimated at 2.4 percentage
points of the GDP. The higher deficit level is the result of
surpassing the undershot expenditure projections com-
bined with other over-expenditures (e.g. decumulation of
unused appropriations by the budgetary units).
Risks of the deficit forecast for 2006
The 9.9 per cent ESA deficit projected in our baseline pro-
jection for 2006 is associated with slightly asymmetrical
distribution of risks pointing towards a higher deficit.
20
As regards the expected development of cash-based
deficit, uncertainty is significantly higher than usual on
account of any possibility of debt assumption inside the
government sector, however, it has no effect on ESA deficit.
As for the risks related to tax revenue projections, we fore-
see symmetrical risks in connection with VAT revenues.
However, our risk assessment for all tax revenues is not
symmetrical, for the actual impact of the measures intro-
duced in September to increase tax revenues is not yet
evident. Hence there is a risk that increasing the tax bur-
den will produce less tax revenues than expected, if tax
evasion grows considerably to a dimension exceeding our
projections. 
Actual spending of appropriations of the chapters and
budgetary units did not reach the levels we have estimat-
ed for the third quarter, therefore, in our view, it is a posi-
tive risk that savings may be realised in this particular
expenditure projection relative to the increased annual
appropriation. 
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The potential assumption of nearly HUF 350 billion in 2006 of the total HUF 500 billion borrowed by NA Zrt. could add 1.5 per cent to the cash based
deficit. However, this debt assumption would not affect the ESA deficit, as, according to the ESA, NA Zrt. is part of general government, so earlier invest-
ment by the company in the road infrastructure had been shown in the ESA deficit. (As the 2007 budget bill only contains the assumption of HUF 146
billion, we assume that the HUF 350 billion loan package will be assumed this year.)
Estimated budgetary developments in 2007
The draft bill contains extraordinary high appropriations for
reserves in order to ascertain meet that deficit target for
2007 are met. The purpose of the extra provisions is to
reduce the risk of failure of the implementation of the budg-
et. The 6.5 per cent projection for ESA deficit relative to
GDP is built on the presumption that the contingency
reserves – comprising close to 0.5 per cent of the GDP – will
not be appropriated. In our view the risks of implementation
remain significant, as it is indicated by the fact that the pes-
simistic deficit scenario (7.7%) estimated without the
spending of reserves is much higher that the deficit target.
The risks of implementation are considered significant
since a number of measures, comprising part of the con-
vergence program, are yet to be specified in detail,
whereas the appropriations of the draft bill are based on
the assumption of these measures being fully executed.
(Of the measures outlined in the convergence program
aimed at reducing expenditures, the Government is yet
to finalise the proposed concepts for restructuring the
natural gas compensation scheme, and the system of
subsidies for local public transportation and long dis-
tance transportation). There are less errors in planning
compared to previous years, however, the proposed fig-
ures for the social security system is still overly opti-
mistic.
The baseline projection for the 2007 deficit path are based
upon the following assumptions:
• On the expenditure side, we supposed that the freezing
of wages and transition to the management of the overall
wage bill will be realised in accordance with the plans of
the government. Furthermore, we were building on the
assumption that the various expenditure items in the cen-
tral budget were planned with due caution, and that they
can be realistically met. 
• A forecast was prepared for the interest balance based
on the forward yield curve.
The background of our deficit forecast differs from the
macroeconomic conditions assumed in the draft bill:
• The draft bill indicates a lower inflation path compared to
the MNB forecast, which means that the loss of expendi-
ture in real terms caused by inflation will be higher
through the usual planning mechanism for expenditure
projections.
• The projection contained in the draft bill for the
increase of gross average wages in the private sector
is well over our projection. Consequently, the draft bill
indicates higher tax and contribution revenues in con-
nection with wages compared to our baseline projec-
tion.
Our forecast relating to the deficit of the central budget
sub-sector is 1.0 percentage points lower than what is con-
tained in the budget act. Compared to the budget act we
expect 0.3 percentage points higher revenues, while our
projection for interest expenses is 0.2 percentage points
lower. Another 0.5 percentage points difference can be
explained by the assumption of the permanent blocking of
the contingency reserves. The deficit target of the govern-
ment sector can be achieved if those reserves are not
spent. The reason our projection for revenues is higher is
that because we expect more net VAT revenues slightly
higher revenues from corporate taxes than what is con-
tained in the budget act. 
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GFS-balance baseline projection: - 9.5 per cent
Tax revenues will be higher than projected in the +0.1 Tax revenues will be lower than projected in -0.4
baseline forecast. the baseline forecast.
The expenditures of public sector agencies and chapters +0.2 The investment expenditures of local governments will be -0.1
will be less than previously expected. higher, investment cycle.
Impact of favourable developments on balance +0.3 Impact of unfavourable developments on balance -0.5
GFS deficit under favourable circumstances -9.2 GFS deficit under unfavourable circumstances -10.0
ESA deficit adjustments -0.4 ESA deficit adjustments -0.4
Lower highway construction costs +0.1
ESA deficit under favourable circumstances -9.5 ESA deficit under unfavourable circumstances -10.4
Table 4-6
Factors of uncertainty in our deficit forecast for 2006 
(as a percentage of GDP)
With respect to the balance of social security funds there
are two major differences between the budget act and our
own forecast:
• The budget act expects higher revenues from contribu-
tions, approximately by 0.2-0.3 percentage points of the
GDP. The difference is primarily attributed to the devia-
tions between the projections for next year’s wage
increases. 
• The estimate contained in the budget act for the expen-
ditures of the Health Fund (payments for pharmaceuti-
cals and medical aids) is approximately 0.2 percentage
points lower than our own central projection. The reason
our forecast differs from the budget act this much is that
because there is no agreement with pharmaceutical
companies as of yet concerning the rate of compensa-
tion they are required to pay in the event any over-spend-
ing in the medicine fund, and because the system of sub-
sidies for pharmaceutical products is not yet available. 
Risks of the deficit forecast for 2007
Our central projection contains a relatively wide range of
risks, between 5.6 and 7.7 per cent. However, since we
rely on the assumption that the reserves will be appropriat-
ed in the event of favourable developments in terms of
deficit, the actual range of risks will be somewhere
between 6.1 and 7.7 per cent. Risks indicating higher
deficit are found in VAT revenues, in the net expenditures
of budgetary units and chapters, expenditures if the social
security system, in the expenditures of local governments,
and in highway construction costs. The realistic projection
of the net expenditures of budgetary units and appropria-
tions of chapters cannot be accurately assessed based on
the limited information we have available. In accordance
with our forecasting rules, we assume that the expenditure
projections contained in the budget act will be observed,
therefore our baseline projection is considered conditional.
There is significant uncertainty surrounding the freezing of
wages in general government, particularly at local govern-
ments and their budget units, as the central budget has no
direct influence on their wage policy. 
We foresee a possibility for lower deficit than predicted in
the baseline scenario in connection with higher VAT rev-
enues and personal income tax revenues, and due to lower
deficit in social security funds. Since our 6.5 per cent main
projection was based on the assumption that the contin-
gency reserves will not be appropriated, therefore, if the
deficit turns out to be lower than that, it is likely that the
contingency reserves will be appropriated. Consequently,
our central projection also constitutes the lower edge of our
risk band. 
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GFS-balance baseline projection: -6.5 per cent
Tax revenues will be higher than projected in the +0.2 Taxes and contributions will be lower than projected in the -0.3
central projection. central projection.
Contributions will be higher than projected. +0.2 The expenditures of local governments will be higher -0.2
Expenditures in the social security system will be reduced +0.2 than predicted in our central projection.
faster than projected in the central projection. The expenditures of budgetary units will be higher -0.4
the projected.
Expenditures in the social security system will be higher -0.2
than planned.
EU funds will finance the underground construction. +0.3 Costs of highway construction will be higher than planned. -0.1
Impact of favourable developments on balance +0.9 Impact of unfavourable developments on balance -1.2
GFS deficit under favourable circumstances -5.6 GFS deficit under unfavourable circumstances -7.7
Contingency reserves spent -0.5 Contingency reserves permanently blocked 0.0
GFS deficit after the appropriation of contingency reserves -6.1 GFS deficit after the blocking of contingency reserves -7.7
ESA deficit adjustments 0.0. ESA deficit adjustments 0.0.
ESA deficit under favourable circumstances -6.1 ESA deficit under unfavourable circumstances -7.7
Table 4-7
Factors of uncertainty in our deficit forecast for 2007 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Estimated budgetary developments in 2008
If the deficit target set out in the 2007 budget act are
met, fulfilment of the 4.3 per cent deficit target specified
in the convergence program for 2008 appears realistic.
We wish to point out that the implementation of next
year’s budget and developments in next year’s fiscal
developments will essentially underline the fulfilment of
deficit target for 2008. 
There are substantial risks involved in the implementation of
the 4.3 per cent deficit target in view of the fact that our base-
line projection does not contain any reserve by contrast to the
fiscal path of 2007 for the eventuality of any mishap in the
deficit target. In our estimation, the measures intended to
increase revenues will not be able to generate any improve-
ment in balancing the budget in 2008, which means that
additional measures aimed at reducing expenditures will be
required in order to meet the proposed deficit target. 
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Box 4-1 Means of risk assessment:
contingency reserves
The Government increased the budget reserves in an attempt to
reduce the risks in meeting next year’s deficit target. According to the
draft of the 2007 budget act a total of approximately 225 billion forint
will be set aside in reserve. 
According to previous years experience, we are of the opinion that the
general and earmarked reserves and provisions set aside in the budget
will be spent during the year, for the purpose of these provisions is to
eliminate “normal” expenditure related tensions that may arise during
the course of the year. Therefore, only the “central contingency
reserves” and the “chapter contingency reserves” can be construed as
effectively available from which to finance the adjustments that may
become necessary in the event of budgetary slippages. The two reserves
contain close to 129.6 billion HUF, enough to cover adjustments up to
about 0.5 per cent of the GDP. As our baseline projection indicates a
deficit in the neighbourhood of GDP 6.5 per cent of the GDP without
the appropriation of the contingency reserves, it leaves only about 80
billion forints worth of contingency reserves to meet the deficit target
for 2007. The contingency reserves reduced to 0.3 per cent of the GDP
could in principle be sufficient to manage the risks in meeting deficit
target, however, in this case the chapter contingency reserves should
left open for transfer for the management of risks arising in other areas
of the general government. The table below illustrates the Govern-
ment’s room for manoeuvre in case of budgetary slippages.
Our conclusions are in applying the principle of prudence. Previous
experience indicate that the risks in meeting the deficit target of local
government is estimated around 0.1-0.2 per cent of the GDP, there-
fore, in line with the principle of prudence, the Government should set
the deficit target this much lower with regard to the central govern-
ment sub-sector directly under its control with a view to the safe
implementation of the convergence program. This means that approx-
imately 25 to 50 billion forints should be blocked for this purpose from
the contingency reserves before the end of the year (provided that the
deficit path will not shift in the direction of positive risks relative to
our baseline projection). Notably, if the Government considers the
risks imminent in the local government sector as exogenous factors,
and handles the risks according to the principle of prudence, the
amount of reserves actually available in the central government sector
to eliminate other risks in connection with meeting the deficit target
will be around 30 to 55 billion forints.
Table 4-8
Estimated size of actual reserves 
(billion HUF) 
A Reserves total 225
B o/w general and earmarked reserves 95
C = A-B Contingency reserves 130
D Blocked reserves covering -50
slippages included in our 
central projection
E = C+D Reserves consistent with meeting 80
the target
F Risks related to projected deficit of -25-50
the local governments
G = E-F Available contingency 30-55
reserves
* The baseline projection is revised to 7.0 per cent of the GDP due to the appropriation of reserves, which is 0.2 percentage point above the deficit target.
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GFS-balance baseline projection: -4.0 per cent
Tax revenues will be higher than projected in the +0.2 Tax revenues will be lower than projected in the -0.2
baseline forecast. baseline forecast.
Revenues from social security contributions will be better +0.2 The proposed wage-freeze in the government sector will -0.3
than expected. not be implemented.
EU funds will be lower than expected, hence co-financing +0.1 Public sector agencies and target-specific -0.2
requirements will also be lower appropriations chapters are exceeded.
EU funds will finance the underground construction. +0.3 The deficit of local governments will be higher -0.2
than planned.
Expenditures in the social security system will be higher -0.2
than planned.
Impact of favourable developments on balance +0.8 Impact of unfavourable developments on balance -1.1
GFS deficit under favourable circumstances -3.2 GFS deficit under unfavourable circumstances -5.1
ESA deficit adjustments -0.2 ESA deficit adjustments -0.2
ESA deficit under favourable circumstances -3.4 ESA deficit under unfavourable circumstances -5.3
Table 4-9
Factors of uncertainty in our central projection for 2008 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Based on the measures outlined in the convergence pro-
gram aimed at reducing expenditures, meaning wage freeze
for the most part, and on the estimated changes in one-off
items the ESA deficit for 2008 may be reduced by an addi-
tional 2.3 percentage points in relation to the GDP by com-
parison to 2007, however, the baseline forecast indicates
substantial asymmetric risk distribution toward higher deficit
levels. The impact of one-off items (Gripen fighter purchase;
outsourcing motorway construction into PPP schemes) on
the improvement in the balance accounts for around 1.0 per
cent of GDP in the reduction of the deficit in 2008, which con-
stitutes close to half of the proposed reduction of ESA deficit. 
As official announced, during the first half of 2006 the sum
of the current account and capital account balance, mean-
ing the external financing requirement – similar to the data
in 2005 – was 6 per cent of the GDP. As far as financing is
concerned, the “bottom-up” external financing requirement
rose due to the higher methodological uncertainty: in terms
of financing, the row “Errors and omissions” of the balance
of payments indicated 1.2 billion Euro for the first half of
2006, that is significantly higher compared to the same
period in 2005. 
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The stability in the external financing requirement for the
first six months occurred due to considerable loosening
of the budget, decreasing financial savings in the house-
hold sector and the decreasing financing requirement of
the corporate sector. The consolidated financing
requirement of the general government came close to 11
per cent of the GDP, that in turn may be attributed to
decreasing tax revenues due to the lower VAT rates, the
rising expenditures in the family support system in
excess of GDP growth, higher gas price compensation,
and to one-off items such as flood cleanup efforts and
the cancellation of the debt of Iraq. Household savings
4.3. External balance 
Box 4-2 Revisions made in current 
account statistics
In September 2006, MNB performed substantial revisions in the cur-
rent account statistics for the 2003-2006 period in line with the GDP-
statistics. Following the revision the 2003 and 2005 current account
deficit dropped by EUR 450 and 520 million, respectively, while there
was no substantial change in the 2004 deficit. In consequence, during
those years the external financing requirement was also lower – by 0.6
per cent of the GDP – than the figure indicated before. The revision
primarily involved services and income balance, and was conducted
due to the following factors: 
• Instead of the amount of reinvested earnings estimated for 2005, the
actual data conveyed in the corporate questionnaires filled out consis-
tent with the balance sheet and profit and loss account were applied,
or the amount of dividends calculated for 2006 also on that basis.
Furthermore, the amount of profit or loss after tax for 2006 varied
according to these new figures. Induced by the revision, in 2005 the
income balance deficit was reduced by close to 120 million Euro.
• With a view to cross-checking data and information with the CSO, in
its current account statistics MNB used the data obtained from the
CSO questionnaires in connection with services. Induced by the revi-
sion, the surplus of service balance increased substantially during
the 2003-2005 period.
The amount indicated under “errors and omissions” in the current
account did not change significantly. As far as financing is concerned,
revisions involved the debts and other similar receivables of compa-
nies from abroad, therefore the external financing requirement shown
in the various external balance indicators declined simultaneously. 
Table 4-10
Effect of revision on external balance indicators
Before revision 2003 2004 2005
Current account deficit (as percent of GDP) 8.7 8.6 7.4
Current account deficit (in EUR billions) 6.4 7.0 6.5
External financing capacity, “from above” (as percent of GDP) 8.7 8.3 6.6
External financing capacity, “from below” (as percent of GDP) 8.4 10.0 8.9
After revision 2003 2004 2005
Current account deficit (as percent of GDP) 8.1 8.5 6.8
Current account deficit (in EUR billions) 5.9 6.9 6.0
External financing capacity, “from above” (as percent of GDP) 8.1 8.2 6.0
External financing capacity, “from below” (as percent of GDP) 7.8 9.9 8.2
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dropped by close to 3 per cent in spite of substantial
payments of wages and modest growth in consump-
tion.
21
The combined GDP-proportionate financing
requirement of the two sectors rose to 7.5 per cent, that
was offset by the setback in financing requirement of the
corporate sector, that may predominantly ruled by
improved profitability and by lower investment activity of
the sector during the second quarter. 
In spite of budgetary measures, in 2006 the GDP-propor-
tionate financing requirement of the general government –
taking into account the accounting of 0.3 percentage
points in connection with the Gripen purchase – may be
close to 11 per cent. The net financing capacity of house-
holds, following the rise that took place between 2003 and
2005, is decreasing since the end of 2005, and is expect-
ed to level out in 2006 at 3-3.5 per cent annually in propor-
tion to the GDP. Due to growing corporate revenues, the
sector’s financing requirement may fall back in spite of ris-
ing investment expenditures in proportion to the GDP, that
is expected to offset the increase of the financing require-
ment of the general government and of the households.
Hence the GDP-proportionate external financing require-
ment of the economy may settle at the level of 2005, that
means 6 per cent for the official “top-down” value. The
“bottom-up” external financing requirement may increase
to 8.5 per cent of GDP due to higher “Net errors and omis-
sions”. 
Chart 4-4
Developments in the financing capacity of the sectors*
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* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on account of
EU accession and by the import increasing impact generated by customs ware-
houses terminated due to EU accession.
** In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government
includes local governments, the ÁPV Zrt., institutions attending to quasi-fiscal
duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest Transport Limited
[BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and
controlled by the government and formally implemented under PPP schemes.
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During the first half of 2006 some major contradictions emerged among the data available on the household sector. The real growth of wages on an
annual level reached 5.4 per cent during the first six months, while the real value of social monetary benefits (pension, family allowance) is close to 10
per cent higher than a year before, that indicates strong growth in household incomes. At the same time, such growth is not justified based on the vol-
ume of household expenditures: the volume of financial savings and investment during the first six months remain behind the same period of the previ-
ous year, while household consumption increased by less than 3 per cent. The contradiction may be resolved by actual incomes below what is indicat-
ed in wage statistics, or by purchases above what is indicated in GDP-statistics.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Estimation Forecast
I. Consolidated general government* -8.8 -8.4 -8.5 -9.3 -10.7 -6.9 -4.9
II. Households 2.7 0.2 2.4 4.2 3.4 2.5 3.0
Corporate sector and “error” (= A - I.- II. ) -0.7 0.1 -2.0 -0.9 1.3 0.4 -0.7
A. External financing capacity. “from above”(=B+C )** -6.8 -8.1 -8.2 -6.0 -6.0 -4.1 -2.6
B. Current account balance** -7.1 -8.1 -8.5 -6.8 -7.1 -5.5 -4.3
- in EUR billions ** -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -6.2 -5.2 -4.3
C. Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.7
D. Net errors and omissions (NEO)*** 0.3 0.3 -1.7 -2.1 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6
External financing capacity “from below” (=A+D) -6.5 -7.8 -9.8 -8.1 -8.5 -6.6 -5.1
Table 4-11
GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of sectors
* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, the ÁPV Zrt., institutions attending to quasi-fiscal duties
(Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest Transport Limited [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by
the government and formally implemented under PPP schemes. 
** Uncertainties over calculations related to trade statistics point to higher current account deficit and external borrowing requirement between 2004 and 2006. 
***Assuming that “Net error and omissions” stabilises at the cumulative level of the last 4 quarters.
In 2007, as a result of the budgetary measures the gener-
al government’s financing requirement is expected to drop
by close to 4 percentage points, to 6.9 per cent. Induced
by lower deficit and by faster inflation in connection with
these measures household real income will fall back in
2007 by more than 4 per cent, accordingly, household
financial savings – because of consumption smoothing – is
expected to fall back even further in 2007. The financing
requirement of the corporate sector may increase, while
profits will be reduced on account of the fiscal policy
aimed to reduce demand and investment will grow slight-
ly. In 2007, the external financing requirement may be
reduced at a rate below the fiscal narrowing of demand, by
1.9 per cent of the GDP. In 2008, the government’s financ-
ing requirement will drop even further, by an additional 
2 percentage points that, due to the narrowing of demand,
may bring about further reduction in the net financing
capacity of the private sector, and a reduction in external
financing requirement by one and a half percentage
points.
In view of the structure of the current account balance,
real economy balance deficit may remain in 2006 at
around the level of 2005 as a result of low domestic
absorption, significant growth in export sales and the
temporary impact of the Gripen deal to increase deficit.
The GDP-proportionate deficit of income balance may
slightly increase due to increasing debts and forint yields
and due to broader weight of foreign exchange financ-
ing. The GDP-proportionate deficit of the current account
balance may rise by 0.3 percentage points on the aggre-
gate relative to 2005, representing an EUR 6.2 billion
deficit. 
Financing the current account deficit
During the first half of 2006, the “bottom-up” external
financing requirement was around 4 billion Euro, and it
exceeded 9 per cent of the six-month GDP. Approximately
one-third of the total financing requirement, 1.3 billion Euro,
was financed by non-debt type capital inflow, that is slight-
ly higher than in 2005, after adjustments by the proceeds
from privatisation. However, the beneficial developments in
the financing structure from the standpoint of investors are
also the result of contradicting tendencies and may be
attributed to individual items to some extent. In the first half
of 2006, apart from the relatively high 1.9 billion Euro of net
direct capital inflow, outflow of portfolio-type securities was
0.5 billion Euro. 
• The sale of MOL’s gas division for close to 1 billion Euro
constituted a major part of the high value of direct capi-
tal inflow. In the second quarter, however, significantly
less foreign direct investment arrived, parallel with the
drop in investment activity. 
• In the case of portfolio-type securities, there was a slight
increase during the first half of 2006 in the volume of
securities held by foreigners. Local institution investors,
on the other hand, increased their investment in foreign
securities by more than 0.7 billion Euro, similar to the
intensity in the last quarter of 2005, bringing the amount
of net outflow to over 0.5 billion Euro.
Foreign credit of banking sector was a significant factor in
increasing debt generating capital inflow, that is a result of fur-
ther increase in foreign exchange credit of the private sector.
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Final/Preliminary data Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services ** -1.5 -2.4 -3.9 -2.7 -0.8 -1.0 0.0 1.1
2. Income balance -5.5 -5.5 -5.0 -6.1 -6.2 -6.5 -6.2 -6.1
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6
I. Current account balance (1+2+3)** -6.2 -7.1 -8.1 -8.5 -6.8 -7.1 -5.5 -4.3
Current account balance in EUR billions** -3.6 -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -6.2 -5.2 -4.3
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.7
External financing capacity (I+II)** -5.6 -6.8 -8.1 -8.2 -6.0 -6.0 -4.1 -2.6
Table 4-12
GDP-proportionate current account structure * 
(in proportion of the GDP, per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
* In 2006–2007 the forecast includes the import resulting from the Hungarian Army’s Gripen fighter lease, amounting to close to 0.3 per cent of the GDP. 
** During the 2004–2008 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward higher current account deficit and higher external
financing requirement.
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